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ABSTRACT 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 
OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS FOR LEASE DISCLOSURE 
September 1983 
Thomas Wilson Oliver 
B.A., Gettysburg College 
M.B.A., Shippensburg University 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Ronald C. Mannino 
This study examines the economic impact of two accounting stan¬ 
dards for lease disclosure, the SEC's ASR 147 and FASB's SFAS 13. The 
three empirical issues addressed are: (1) whether the accounting 
standards influenced firms to change their financing or leasing poli¬ 
cies in order to mollify the reporting effects of the standards; 
(2) whether there was a capital market reaction associated with the 
standards; and (3) whether the market reactions can be explained by 
firm-specific economic variables. 
The results presented on the first research issue suggested that 
•firms affected by SFAS 13 may have initiated changes in financing and 
leasing decisions in order to mollify the apparent effects of SFAS 13. 
A sample of firms affected by SFAS 13 had statistically significant 
differences in changes in debt and leasing variables in comparison to 
a matched sample of firms which would not have been strongly affected 
vi 
by SFAS 13. A similar hypothesis regarding firms affected by ASR 147 was 
not supported. 
Regarding the second research issue, the tests of capital market 
reaction to ASR 147 and SFAS 13, in terms of abnormal price reaction, 
did not indicate a statistically significant difference between the experi¬ 
mental and control group of firms. The tests of shifts in systematic risk 
indicated a relatively larger number of shifts in risk for those firms 
affected by ASR 147 and SFAS 13 in comparison to the control samples. 
These results were borne out at the aggregate portfolio level of analysis 
for ASR 147, but not for SFAS 13. 
The tests regarding the third research issue, explanations of capital 
market reactions associated with SFAS 13, did not support hypotheses 
developed from prior research and a priori reasoning as explanation of 
abnormal price reaction to SFAS 13. The propositions and models discussed 
as explanations of shifts in systematic risk, however, did provide evidence 
of explanatory power for risk-shifts surrounding the first exposure draft 
of SFAS 13. Specifically shifts in systematic risk were found to be related 
to changes in debt ratios and to firms' non-capitalized leases. These 
results further support the propositions and a priori reasoning of earlier 
studies. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Accounting policy decisions and associated economic consequences are 
an area of growing concern in accounting research. Much research has 
focused upon the reaction in capital markets to accounting policy decisions 
as one aspect of the economic consequences of those decisions. More 
recently, attention has been given to explaining the reaction in the 
capital markets in terms of underlying economic variables, and to inves¬ 
tigating other types of economic consequences such as the effect of policy 
determination on the decision-making behavior of corporate management, 
creditors, unions and government. 
It has become fairly clear in recent years that the accounting 
standard setting process is becoming increasingly political in nature. 
This has been evident in several ways. Parties outside of the accounting 
profession are becoming more involved in the standard-setting process. 
Zeff [1978] notes that as corporate management, through the lobbying 
process, began intervening in the standard setting process, management's 
arguments would be buttressed by the traditional accounting model and an 
apparent concern for unbiased and theoretically sound accounting procedures. 
Since the early 1970s, however, management has turned to a more straight¬ 
forward tack and has been using economic consequences arguments in the 
lobbying process. Governmental bodies and agencies have also shown in¬ 
creasing concern during the 1970s for accounting standards and policies 
which foster economic behavior consistent with the nation's macro-economic 
1 
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goals. [Solomons, 1978] As a result of these developments, accounting 
policy makers have come under increasing pressure to consider explicitly 
the economic consequences of their decisions.1 
The purpose of the research presented here is to assess the economic 
consequences of the accounting policy decisions and authoritative pronounce¬ 
ments surrounding one important accounting issue, accounting for leases. 
Both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board have been active in recent years in determin¬ 
ing disclosure requirements for leases. The SEC considered the matter in 
Regulation S-X, and later in Accounting Series Release (ASR) 132, ASR 147 
in 1973, and ASR 225 in 1977. The disclosure requirements of ASR 147 were 
the most extensive that had been prescribed, and were the first to mandate 
the disclosure of the net present value of fixed minimum lease commitments. 
In addition, ASR 147 required the disclosure of the effect on net income, 
as if the leases were capitalized, if that effect was material. These 
disclosures were required in the notes accompanying the financial statements 
in the 10-K reports filed with the SEC. 
The FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 13 
on leases in 1976, to be effective as of January 1977. The effect was to 
require the actual capitalization of financing leases in the balance 
sheets of lessee companies. The extensive disclosures required by the 
SEC in ASR 147 were now mandatory in the financial statements themselves, 
rather than as supplementary disclosures. The most recent important 
authoritative pronouncement on the issue of leasing came from the SEC in 
the form of ASR 225 in 1977 which required retroactive compliance with SFAS 
13 beginning with statements issued for fiscal years ending after December 
24, 1978. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
In discussing the background necessary for the research proposal, 
several areas must be addressed. First, the evolution of the standards 
for lease accounting will be charted with a discussion of the various 
theories, ideas and pressures leading to the development of the current 
authoritative pronouncements. Next a discussion of capital market research 
will be undertaken, including consideration of the efficient market 
hypothesis and its implications for the current research, the various 
theoretical and empirical models used in capital market research, and 
findings of capital market studies relating to accounting issues and 
accounting policy decisions. Finally, the several capital market studies 
relating specifically to the policy decisions on lease disclosure will 
be reviewed. 
Accounting Standards for Lease Disclosure 
Leasing as a financing device did not begin to gain popularity until 
the 1940s. The American Institute of Accountants, the predecessor of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), first dealt 
with the issue in 1949 with the issuance of Accounting Research Bulletin 
No. 38 (ARB 38). This represented the first endorsement of capitalization 
of leases that were "in substance, no more than an installment purchase 
of property." [AIA, 1949] This statement also required the disclosure 
of any material annual rentals and information on the period of the lease 
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involved. Except for restatement of this position in ARB 43 (June 1953), 
nothing further was published by any official body until 1962 when the 
AICPA published Accounting Research Study No. 4 (ARS 4). 
The study, "Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements," written 
by Professor John H. Myers, stated that it is the right to the use of 
property that constitutes the asset rather than the purchase nature of 
the transaction. As a result he advocated the capitalization of al1 
leases which conveyed those rights. The principal criterion specified 
by Myers for the conveyance of those rights was the noncancelabi1ity of 
the transaction. [Myers, 1962] 
In response to Myers, two members of the ARS 4 project advisory 
committee strongly dissented. Ira A. Schur based his criticism on what 
he called "the theory of commitments in general and...the basic functions 
of the balance sheet." [FASB, 1974] Both Schur and Walter R. Staub voiced 
serious reservations about practical difficulties of implementation and 
the marginal benefits of capitalization compared to more extensive foot¬ 
note disclosure. 
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 5 followed in September 1964, 
and this statement did little more than reaffirm ARB 38, in that only 
those leases that constituted, in substance, purchases were required to 
be capitalized. In issuing APB Opinion 5 as such, the APB in effect re¬ 
jected Myers' position that the capitalization of leases should depend 
upon the conveyance of property rights rather than the purchase nature 
of the transaction. What APB Opinion 5 did do, or attempted to do, was to 
clarify criteria for determining when a transaction was in substance a 
purchase. The Board felt that the terms of the lease should result in the 
5 
creation of a "material equity" in the leased property. A number of 
criteria were noted by the APB for creation of such "material equity." 
Among these criteria was the noncancelabi1ity of the lease which Myers had 
suggested as an operational definition of property rights of transfer. 
However, the APB also identified bargain purchase or bargain renewal 
options as further criteria necessary for a purchase, in substance, to 
have transpired. [APB, 1964] 
While Opinion No. 5 did take some steps toward a clarification of 
lease accounting, its critics were numerous. Initial critics included 
three APB members whose views were included in the opinion: two qualified 
assents and a dissent. Walker assented to the opinion but felt the capi¬ 
talization of leases that were in substance installment purchases was 
inappropriate because of the legal status of leases and because he believed 
capitalization would "inflate" the balance sheet with questionable liabili¬ 
ties and assets. Moonitz felt that APB Opinion No. 5 did not resolve any¬ 
thing concerning the nature of a lease transaction. The lone dissenter, 
Spacek, argued for the capitalization of all noncancel able leases, as 
Myers had. His arguments were that obligations under lease contracts were 
legitimate corporate liabilities having a claim on other corporate assets 
ahead of equity investors. 
Research by William D. Hall noted that the strongest criticisms of 
APB Opinion 5 were that it did not go far enough in requiring capitali¬ 
zation of leases. He lent empirical support to this by noting that Opinion 
5 did not result in widespread capitalization of leases. [Hall, 1967] Other 
critics have argued that the criteria for defining a lease that is in sub¬ 
stance a purchase were ambiguous, difficult to apply, or lacking a 
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theoretical basis. Mellman and Bernstein attacked the "material equity" 
criterion as being both inappropriate and difficult to apply. [Mellman and 
Bernstein, 1966] It seemed that the board was saying that, in order for 
an asset to be created, legal title must exist and the asset must be 
paid for before its economic life was exhausted, which to some indicated 
an unjustified preoccupation with the asset side of the balance sheet. 
In reference to the income measurement question Graham and Langenderfer 
felt that non-capitalization resulted in the understatement of expense 
and the overstatement of income in the early years of the lease and vice 
versa in the later years. That is, they felt the proper charge to expense 
should be some depreciation charge plus a declining annual interest charge 
rather than the level rental charge under a lease. [Graham and Langenderfer, 
1965] 
The next major development in lease accounting, chronologically, was 
APB Opinion No. 7, "Accounting for Leases in Financial Statements of 
Lessors," which defined two methods of lease accounting for lessors: the 
financing method and the operating method. The financing method was to be 
used for leases which pass on to the lessee most of the "risks and rewards" 
of ownership, while the operating method was considered appropriate when 
the lessor retained most of those "risks and rewards" of ownership. While 
the objective of Opinion No. 5 was to define appropriate criteria for 
capitalization. Opinion No. 7 considered the major problem of lease 
accounting by lessors to be the allocation of revenue and expense to 
accounting periods in order to fairly state the lessor's net income. As 
a result a "financing lease" was to be treated in a method analogous to 
that used by lending institutions for level reoayment plans on secured 
7 
loans. With operating leases, the payments were to be recognized as 
revenue throughout the life of the lease and any appropriate expense such 
as depreciation or maintenance was to be recognized as well. 
The major critics of APB Opinion 7 complained of its inconsistency 
with APB Opinion 5. One in particular, Gerald Alvin, noted that, based on 
the criteria in respective pronouncements, a lessee could quite easily 
be treating a lease as being in substance a purchase while on the other 
hand the lessor might be treating the same transaction as not being a sale. 
Clearly, from a theoretical standpoint, it is difficult to justify a single 
transaction being a purchase by one party yet not a sale by the other. 
[Alvin, 1970] The APB recognized the inconsistency yet did not consider 
it a serious flaw because they felt the two pronouncements had different 
objectives. That is, APB No. 7 stressed allocation of revenues and expenses 
by lessors as being critical and APB No. 5 had the major focus of capital¬ 
ization or non-capitalization of leases. The numerous critics of the two 
opinions were divided on which was in need of revision. Some felt APB 
Opinion 5 needed amendment to conform to Opinion 7, others felt the 
opposite was true, and still others believed that neither opinion was 
satisfactory. The APB itself acknowledged in Opinion 7 that the lease 
accounting issue was unresolved and further consideration would be given 
to it. 
Subsequent APB action included a section in Opinion No. 10 (an omni¬ 
bus opinion) on accounting for lease transactions between related parties 
(December 1966), and an interpretation of Opinion No. 7 in November 1971 
which was intended to clarify criteria for transferring "risks and rewards" 
of ownership to a lessee from a manufacturer/dealer lessor. 
8 
In addition to the AICPA, the other official body active in determining 
disclosure requirements has been the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). In Regulation S-X, since superceded by Accounting Series Release 
No. 147--ASR 147, and ASR 225, the SEC mandated significant footnote 
disclosures, including minimum annual rentals for five years. ASR 132, 
"Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements," (November 1972) provided 
an interpretation of APB Opinion 5 in that a transaction wherein the lessor 
has no independent economic substance should be accounted for as a pur¬ 
chase by the lessee. Also, in February 1973, ASR 141 was released as a 
clarification of Regulation S-X. 
In January 1973, the APB released an exposure draft of a proposed 
opinion on lease accounting, but dropped the matter in April 1973 in 
deference to the FASB. In June 1973, the SEC released its major pronounce¬ 
ment on lease accounting: ASR 147, "Amendment to Regulation S-X Requiring 
Improved Disclosure of Leases." The new disclosure requirements were 
quite significant. It required disclosure of: 
1) total rental expense, reduced by rentals from subleases, that 
entered into the determiniation of results of operations, also to 
include separate disclosure of rentals on non-capitalized financing leases; 
2) minimum rental commitments under all noncancel able leases, with 
separate disclosure of the amounts applicable to non-capitalized financing 
leases; 
3) the present value of the minimum lease commitment discounted at 
the rate of interest implicit in the lease for all non-capitalized finan¬ 
cing leases; 
4) the impact upon net income, for each period an income statement 
9 
is presented, as if all non-capitalized financing leases had been capital¬ 
ized; and 
5) any restrictions on dividends, further debt, further leasing or 
any other information necessary to assess the effect of lease commitments 
upon the financial position, results of operations and changes in financial 
position of the lessee. 
In addition the SEC defined a financing lease as "...a lease which, during 
the noncancelable lease period, either (i) covers 75% or more of the 
economic: life of the property or (ii) has terms which assure the lessor 
of a full recovery of the fair market value, which would normally be repre¬ 
sented by his investment, of the property at the inception of the lease 
plus a reasonable return on the use of the assets, subject only to 
limited risk in the realization of the residual interest in the property 
and the credit risks generally associated with secured loans." [FASB, 1974] 
The APB, in a reversal of its April decision, had put leasing 
back on its agenda prior to the SEC's ASR 147 being released, and on 
June 30, 1973, they released Opinion No. 31, "Disclosure of Lease Commit¬ 
ments by Lessees." In doing so, the Board indicated that some investors, 
credit grantors and rating services had stated that disclosures under 
APB 5 were not always adequate in providing relevant information. 
The FASB notes, however, that APB No. 31's disclosure requirements 
were less extensive than the SEC had mandated in ASR 147. It was in fact 
ASR 147 which laid much of the foundation for SFAS 13. In ASR 147 the 
disclosure of the present values of net fixed minimum lease commitments 
was made mandatory, while in APB 31, such disclosures were optional. 
ASR 147 requires the disclosure of the impact on net income as if finan- 
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cing leases had been capitalized; APB 31 does not. Additionally, the SEC 
required that any contractual arrangement having the economic substance of 
a lease must be considered a lease for ASR 147's purposes, whereas the_ 
APB made no such provision. 
These are the important historical antecedents to SFAS 13. The devel¬ 
opment of SFAS 13 even after the release of ASR 147 was slow. The FASB 
deliberated over two years after the addition of lease accounting to its 
agenda before the issuance of the first exposure draft (August 1975) on the 
subject. After that, another eleven months elapsed before the July 1976 
exposure draft which eventually became SFAS 13. 
The most significant aspect of SFAS 13 was to require the capitali¬ 
zation of leases meeting any of four very specific criteria: 
1) the lease transfers ownership of the property to the lessee by 
the end of the lease term; 
2) the lease contains a bargain purchase option, a provision allowing 
the lessee, at his option, to purchase the leased property for a price 
lower than the expected fair value of the property at the date the option 
becomes exercisable, with the expected fair value to be determined at the 
inception of the lease; 
3) the term of lease, fixed noncancel able term, is equal to seventy- 
five percent or more of the estimated economic life of the asset; or 
4) the present value of the minimum lease payments is 90 percent 
or more of the fair value of the property to the lessor, fair value being 
defined essentially as the fair market value as of the inception of the 
lease. 
Neither of the latter two criteria are applicable when the term of the 
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lease begins within the last 25 percent of the leased asset's total 
economic life. Leases meeting any one of the above requirements must be 
capitalized. The capitalized value of the lease is the present value of 
the minimum lease payments discounted at the lessee's incremental cost of 
debt, unless the implicit rate of the lease is less than that and is known 
to the lessee. This value is capitalized as an asset and a liability, 
unless this exceeds the fair value of the asset, in which case that is 
capitalized. 
The capitalized asset is then amortized in accordance with the firm's 
normal depreciation policies for assets of that kind over a period of the 
life of the lease, or the life of the asset if ownership is transferred 
or the lease contains a bargain purchase option. Other disclosures include 
1) the gross amount of assets capitalized by major functional classes 
2) the future minimum lease payments in aggregate and for each of the 
five succeeding fiscal years; 
3) the total minimum sublease rentals receivable under noncancelable 
subleases; 
4) total contingent rentals paid during the period. 
Those leases not meeting any of the criteria for capital leases are con¬ 
sidered operating leases and disclosure for these includes: 
1) rental expense for the period; 
2) future minimum rental payments in aggregate and for each of the 
five succeeding years; 
3) total minimum sublease rentals receivable for leases exceeding 
one year. 
All lessees are required to give a general description of the leasing 
arrangements as well. 
12 
Accounting for lessors is generally symmetric with lessee accounting. 
In general leases meeting any of the above criteria for capitalization 
are considered either direct financing or sales-type leases. These leases 
must, however, meet two additional criteria: 
1) collection must be reasonably predictable; 
2) no important uncertainties must exist about unreimbursable costs 
the lessor has yet to incur. 
If both of the latter conditions and at least one of the former are not 
met, then the lease is an operating lease. 
The FASB statement went into effect as of January 1977 and required 
all leases entered into after January 1, 1977 to be accounted for under 
FASB 13. A lagged transition period was allowed for leases entered into 
prior to January 1, 1977 with all leases requiring retroactive application 
of FASB by December 24, 1981. 
While SFAS is the current major pronouncement from the FASB on leas¬ 
ing, it has been subject to numerous amendments and interpretations because 
of its complexity. Amendments include: 
1) SFAS 17—Accounting for Leas-es Initial Direct Costs; 
2) SFAS 22—Changes in the Provisions of Lease Agreements Resulting 
from Refundings of Tax-Exempt Debt; 
3) SFAS 23—Inception of the Lease; 
4) SFAS 26—Profit Recognition on Sales-Type Leases of Real Estate; 
5) SFAS 27—Classification of Renewals or Extensions of Existing 
Sales-Type or Direct Financing Leases; 
6) SFAS 28—Accounting for Sales with Leasebacks; and 
7) SFAS 29—Determining Contingent Rentals. 
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Numerous FASB interpretations (nos. 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, and 27) have been 
fostered by SFAS 13 as well. Although the extraordinary complexity of the 
issue as well as the pronouncement has led to the proliferation of FASB 
amendments and interpretations, the major thrust of the initial FASB 
pronouncement of SFAS 13 remains unchanged: the requirement of capitalization 
of leased assets and the definitions of specific criteria for determining 
those leases to be capitalized. 
The most recent authoritative pronouncement on the lease issue was 
the SEC's ASR 225 issued on August 31, 1977. The substance of the SEC's 
statement was 1) to bring its financial statement disclosure requirements 
into line with SFAS 13, 2) to require retroactive compliance with SFAS 13 
beginning with statements for years ending after December 24, 1978, essen¬ 
tially eliminating the FASB's long transition period, and 3) to delineate 
disclosures to be made by those enterprise lessees subject to rate regula¬ 
tion which do not captialize leases as indicated by SFAS 13. 
The development of lease accounting standards exemplifies the dynamic 
and political nature of the determination of accounting policy. While it 
seems unlikely that SFAS 13 and its amendments and ASR 225 will be the 
final word on lease accounting,2 they represent the fruition of a long 
debate and lobbying process, and stand as the most important policy 
decisions on the lease accounting issue. In addition, because of the 
magnitude of interest in this issue from the financial community, the 
accounting profession and corporate management as well, it affords a fer¬ 
tile opportunity to study the economic impact of a particular accounting 
policy decision. 
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cost which allows them a fair return for the services they provide. 
[Copeland and Weston, 1979] 
Eugene Fama [1970, 1976] deserves much of the credit for operation¬ 
alizing the concept of capital market efficiency. He identifies three 
forms or levels of market efficiency which differ in reference to what 
information is relevant or available and, therefore, reflected in the 
prices of assets. These three levels are: 1) weak market efficiency, 
2) semi-strong market efficiency, and 3) strong market efficiency. 
Weak market efficiency means that any information contained in the 
historical price sequence or return sequence is already fully reflected 
in the current price of the asset. Investors cannot use the information 
available in these sequences to earn an abnormally high return; that is, 
investors cannot use this information to "beat the market." Semi-strong 
market efficiency goes beyond that in that it implies that all publicly 
available information is fully reflected in the current price of the asset. 
Publicly available information would include the accounting data avail¬ 
able in the companies' annual reports as well as earnings reports from the 
financial press and the various public investment advisory data available 
in the Wall Street Journal or Barron's. Strong market efficiency means 
that all information, public or private (inside the company), is reflected 
in the current price of the asset. 
The empirical evidence is voluminous on the former two levels of the 
EMH and somewhat sparse on the latter. It is the semi-strong form of the 
EMH which has the most relevance for accounting research and for the 
research problem at hand. The important empirical work on all three levels 
of the EMH will be discussed; however, special emphasis will be given to 
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the semi-strong form of EMH. 
Much of the early empirical work on efficient markets centered 
around tests of various times series behavior patterns of security prices 
and returns. The three commonly used models are 1) the fair game model, 
2) the martingale or submartingale model, and 3) the random walk model. 
A fair game is a process in which, on average with a large number of 
samples, the expected return on an asset is equal to the actual return. 
A martingale is a process in which the expectation of the next period's 
price is equal to the current price; a submartingale is a process in 
which the expectation of the next period's price is greater than the 
current price. Both the martingale and submartingale processes are also 
fair games. Finally, a random walk means that there is no difference be¬ 
tween the distribution of returns conditional on a given information 
set and the unconditional returns. In other words, all the parameters 
of the distribution of returns must be stationary over time. The early 
empirical studies on weak capital market efficiency, such as by Fama 
[1965] and others indicates that the stock market does not follow a 
strict random walk model. Filter tests by Alexander [1961] and Fama and 
Blume [1970] do indicate, however, that the fair game and submartingale 
models are not inconsistent with empirical evidence. The evidence cited 
above as well as a myriad of other studies suggest that capital markets 
are, at a minimum, efficient in the weak sense. Security prices were 
found to conform to the fair game and submartingale models although not 
to a strict random walk model because of slight first order dependencies 
in prices and because of nonstationalities in the underlying price dis¬ 
tribution over time. 
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The semi-strong form of the EMH, because of its focus on public 
information of all kinds has led to empirical work using accounting 
information. The semi-strong EMH implies that all publicly available 
information is rapidly impounded into the security price. Financial 
accounting information is, of course, part of the publicly available 
information set. Empirical tests of this form of the EMH include tests of 
information effects of various types of accounting announcements: earnings 
announcements, accounting changes, mandatory or discretionary and 
cosmetic or substantive. Ball and Brown [1968] found that information 
contained in annual earnings announcements is fully reflected in stock 
prices within a few days. Ball and Brown's work is also important because 
of the methodological breakthrough, the introduction of the abnormal 
price index (API), which will be discussed later. Other empirical work 
on the semi-strong EMH tests the impounding of other public, but non¬ 
accounting information—stock splits, dividend announcements, new stock 
issues, and large secondary offerings. One landmark study of this type 
was the Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll [1969] study which found that 
information contained in stock splits regarding a firm's future dividend 
prospects is fully reflected on average at the time of the split. Scholes 
[1969] found similar results for new issues and large secondary offerings. 
The Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll study also introduced an important new 
methodology, the cumulative average residual (CAR) analysis, which will 
be discussed further in a subsequent section. 
The strong form of the EMH is largely unsupported. Corporate in¬ 
siders and specialists on the stock exchange are the only groups whose 
access to inside information is documented. Neiderhoffer and Osbourne 
[1969] found that specialists use knowledge about unfilled limit orders 
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to generate monopoly profits ans Scholes [1969] found that corporate 
insiders have valuable non-public information about their own firms. 
Althoguh Jensen's [1968, 1969] studies of mutual fund managers do not 
indicate any systematic superiority of performance, compared with the 
market in general, it is not clear that mutual fund managers do indeed 
have a monopolistic access to superior information. Hence, this evidence 
cannot be interpreted as supporting the strong form EMH. 
The evidence of capital market efficiency may be summarized as follows 
1) overwhelmingly supportive of weak market efficiency, 2) highly support¬ 
ive of semi-strong efficiency, and 3) non-supportive of strong market 
efficiency. As a result the research to be presented in this study will 
assume that markets are efficient at least in the semi-strong form. The 
assumption of strong market efficiency is unnecessary to conduct this 
research. 
Empirical and Theoretical Models 
Most of the capital market studies done in accounting have had as 
their basis one of two important models: 1) the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) or, 2) the Market Model. 
The CAPM grew out of the portfolio theory work by Markowitz [1952, 
1959]. It was developed by Sharpe [1963, 1964] and Treynor [1961] and 
later refined by Lintner [1965], Mossin [1966] and Black [1972]. The 
CAPM may be stated: 
E(R,.) = Rf + [E(RJ - Rf] [a1m/o2m] 0) 
where: 
E(R.j) = the expected return on the asset; 
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Rp = the "risk-free" rate of return; 
E(Rm) = the expected return on the market portfolio; 
2 
o- = the variance of the return on the market portfolio; 
o*im = the covariance of the market portfolio with asset i. 
This is the Sharpe's and Treynor's CAPM. In words, the model implies that 
the required rate of return on any asset i is equal to the risk-free rate 
of return plus a risk premium. The price of risk is: 
2 
The quantity of risk is crm/crm, often denoted as g.. The assumptions upon 
which the CAPM is based are: 
1) investors are risk averse; 
2) investors are price takers and have homogenous expectations about 
asset returns which follow a joint normal distribution; 
3) there is a risk-free asset and unlimited lending and borrowing at 
that risk-free rate; 
4) all assets are fixed in quantity, marketable and perfectly 
divisible; 
5) there are frictionless capital markets and information is cost¬ 
less; 
6) there are no market imperfections such as limitations on short 
selling or taxes. 
While the assumptions are restrictive, the model has been shown to be robust 
to the relaxation of certain assumptions. For instance Black [1972] showed 
that the proof of the CAPM does not depend on the existence of a risk-free 
asset, only a "zero beta" portfolio having no covariance with the market. 
The "market model," a second important model for capital market 
research, unlike the CAPM, does not rely on any particular theory. The 
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market model simply specifies that the return on any security i is a 
linear function of the return on a market portfolio of securities: 
R 
where: 
it ai + 3iRmt + e it (2) 
J-L. 
R^ the return on the i ' security in period t; 
Rmt the return on ^e market portfolio in period t; 
a1-,6i parameters of the model; and 
is a random disturbance. 
Usually, the return on a security is: 
(Pi, t+1 ' PiJ + Dit 
Pit 
wi th : 
P.^ price of security i in period t; and 
dividend on security i in period t. 
The market model was developed by Sharpe [1963], although first suggested 
by the work of Markowitz [1952, 1959]. Fama [1970] has taken the one 
period CAPM, given it a multiperiod interpretation and shown its equi¬ 
valence to the market model. He noted that: 
E [R^. ] R^r ~ 3-j t 6^E (R^) 
and if Rf - 8-R.p s (1 - b .)R^ is defined as a; then E(R.j) = a. + 6^.E(Rm) 
which is the market model, in ex ante form. The two are equivalent if 1) 
the risk-free rate is stationary across time, the distributions of R.^ 
and R . are stable across time and Rmt can be well approximated by some 
market index. 
Tests of the market model have been done by Blume [1968] and Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen and Roll [1969] and the evidence suggests that it is well 
specified as a linear regression model in that: 
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1) a and 6 estimates appear to be relatively stable over time; 
2) estimates of e. appear to be serially uncorrelated over time; 
and 
3) estimates of e.^ appear to be contemporaneously uncorrelated 
with Rmt- 
The empirical work on the CAPM, on the other hand, as reported by Blume 
and Friend [1970, 1973], Fama and MacBeth [1973] and Black, Jensen and 
Scholes [1972], in general, found that factors other than s. (e.g., 
2 
8 .j and unsystematic risk) were not significant in explaining returns 
cross-sectionally. However, tests of: 
(Rj “ R-p) + 8-j (A) 
did not find Sg = 0 as the model would predict, nor did they find 6-j 
= R - R* as the model would predict, 
m t r 
Capital Market Research and Accounting Information 
A number of the studies addressing the issue of market efficiency 
with relation to accounting information have already been discussed as 
the evidence on market efficiency in the semi-strong form became increas¬ 
ingly convincing, attention turned away from tests of market efficiency 
and toward tests of the information content of accounting disclosures. 
More specifically, studies have often considered differential market 
reactions to different information disclosures. These include: 
1) Application of different generally accepted accounting principles 
across firms; 
3) changes in accounting methods or techniques; a) discretionary: 
(1) substantive, and (2) cosmetic; b) mandatory: (1) substantive, and 
(2) cosmetic. 
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The Ball and Brown [1968] and Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll [1969] 
studies are important for many reasons, but are cited here for methodo¬ 
logical reasons. Ball and Brown introduced the idea of an abnormal perfor¬ 
mance index (API) and FFJR introduced the residual or cumulative average 
residual (CAR) technique. 
Both the API and the CAR are based on the market model: 
R.-4. = a. + b_.R . + e.-4. it i l mt it (2) 
where: 
R.^ = the return on the iu security in period t; 
Rmt = the return on the market portfolio in period t; 
a, b are parameters of the model; 
e.£ is the random disturbance term for period t. 
A A 
The parameters are estimated a. and g. and a predicted return R.. 
1 t 
A 
derived. Then a residual is calculated: 




(1 + ) 
is 
N is.the number of firms in a particular portfolio or subsample; 
T is the number of time periods used. 
FFJR's CAR is: 
T N 
CAR. = E 1/N E e.f /5\ 
J t=i j=i Jt 1 ‘ 
N and T as above. 
Much subsequent research has used one methodology or the other with some 
variation. 
Hong, Kaplan, and Mandelker [1978] studied the application of pooling 
as opposed to purchase methods of accounting for business combinations. 
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They used the FFJR CAR methodology and were unable to find evidence of 
differential reaction in the capital market as long as cash flows were 
unaffected. The latter consideration is one that has arisen in many studies 
of changes in accounting methods or techniques, the second type of infor¬ 
mation content study listed above, as differentiating substantive from 
cosmetic changes in accounting technique. As background to this study, 
the ideas of substance and form need further discussion. The issue has 
received renewed attention recently in a somewhat broader context. [Foster, 
1980] 
In the accounting literature during most of the 1970s, a substantive 
accounting change has been defined as one in which the cash flows of the 
firm are affected by the change in accounting method in some way. Thus the 
immediate cash flow of the firm as well as the expected future cash flows 
of the firm are modified in some way. 
A cosmetic accounting change is simply a change which may affect the 
reported accounting variables such as accounting net income, total assets, 
debt or equity, but has no real economic effect such as modifying cash 
flows. For this study, substantive and cosmetic accounting changes will 
be defined more broadly. A substantive change in accounting technique is 
defined as any change which affects or changes the information set avail¬ 
able to the market. This would possibly have an impact upon the expected 
return on distribution of returns on a security. This would include, but 
not be limited to, accounting changes which affect taxable income and, 
therefore, cash flows and expected cash flows. This is commonly presented 
in the literature as the main example of a substantive accounting change; 
however. Watts and Zimmerman [1978] identified a number of factors that 
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could lead to changes in cash flows even if no tax considerations are 
involved. These include increased political costs such as lobbying costs 
and labor-related costs, increased regulatory costs if the firm is in a 
regulated industry, and increased information production costs. Finally, 
it is possible, under the broader definition of a substantive change, to 
include those accounting method changes which reveal to the market new 
information about the business or financial risk of a firm which in turn 
affects the market risk of the firm's common equity.3 
The preceding discussion has focused on substantive accounting 
changes. Two types were identified: 1) those affecting cash flows in some 
way, through taxes or otherwise, and 2) those revealing new information 
to the market without directly affecting cash flows. These will be referred 
to henceforth as "impact substantive" and "informational substantive" 
accounting changes. Those accounting changes which neither have a cash 
flow impact nor reveal new information to the market will be considered 
cosmetic. In addition to the substantive-cosmetic categorization, account¬ 
ing changes may also be classified by the source of the change—corporate 
management or some policy-making body such as the APB, FASB or SEC. 
Management-initiated changes will be referred to as "discretionary" and 
those required by some authoritative body will be called "mandatory." 
Studies of accounting changes may be classified using these two levels of 
categorization. Table 1 presents the two-way classification with examples 
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Sunder [1973, 1975] studied firms switching from FIFO to LIFO 
accounting for inventory and firns switching from LIFO to FIFO accounting 
for inventory. Since FIFO to LIFO switches have positive tax effects and 
_IrC to FIFO switches nave negative tax effects during inflationary 
periods, he nyoothesized a positive reaction to the former and a negative 
reaction to the latter. Using the FFJR CAR technique, he found results 
consistent with nis hypothesis. 
Kaplan and Roll [1972] studied firms making one of two changes that 
had no effect on taxes or cash flows: (a) switching from deferral of the 
Investment ~ax Credit (I^C) to the flow-through"1 method, recognizing the 
benefit of the ITC in the year of investment, or (b) switchbacks to 
straight-line depreciation ^ron accelerated depreciation for financial 
reporting but not for tax purposes. For the first type of change they 
found a snail but probably insignificant market reaction, in spite of a 
positive effect on earnings per share (EPS). The results frocn the second 
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type of change, they felt, were attributed to a pre-selection bias. 
Simonds and Collins [1979] studied a mandatory, substantive account¬ 
ing disclosure requirement change, the requirement by the SEC that firms 
disclose line of business information. After specifying theoretical 
reasons for possible shifts in systematic risk of securities,they tested 
the hypothesis that the systematic risk of the securities did indeed 
shift and found significant changes in beta for portfolios of securities 
affected by the change. 
Finally, a number of studies [Lev, 1979; Dyckman and Smith, 1979; 
and Collins and Dent, 1979] were made of the market impact of SFAS 19 
on accounting in the oil and gas extractive industries. The proposed 
statement eliminated "full cost" accounting in favor of "successful 
efforts," and was apparently cosmetic. Although the FASB subsequently 
rescinded SFAS 19, some researchers did address the issue of the market 
impact of the proposed change in accounting requirements with regard to 
oil and gas extraction. Although results conflict among the studies, 
several authors found a significant market reaction to the proposed 
change. Since the change was apparently cosmetic, this result was contro¬ 
versial. A subsequent study by Collins, Rozeff, and Dhaliwal [1980] 
addressed the question of explaining this reaction cross-sectionally. 
Using a cross-sectional model they were able to explain this abnormal 
reaction in terms of underlying economic variables. 
Another important area of research in this category addresses the 
association between accounting data and systematic risk of common stocks 
as measured by beta. Until recently, however, much of the work has been 
what Lev [1974a] described as "fishing expeditions"; that is, correlational 
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studies lacking theoretical bases. A number of more recent studies have 
developed a theoretical framework for the association of market-determined 
♦ 
and accounting determined risk. Studies of both types will be reviewed 
in this section. 
One of the initial studies in the area was that done by Ball and 
Brown [1969], who used correlational analysis to test the relationship 
between two covariability measures: 
1) the covariability between a security's return and the market 
return; and 
2) the covariability between the accounting income of the individual 
firm and an economy-wide index of accounting income. 
Their data indicated that there was a significant relationship between 
the systematic variability of accounting income numbers and market returns. 
Another study, by Beaver, Kettler and Scholes [1970], presented evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that accounting measures of risk are impounded 
in the market-price based risk measures. Beta coefficients were empirically 
shown to be associated with a number of factors including, among others, 
financial leverage and earnings variability, two factors affected by 
capitalization of leased assets. Beaver, Kettler and Scholes also suggest 
areas of further research including examination of whether investors do 
react directly to accounting information. In a later study, Beaver and 
Manegold [1975] found a statistically significant association between 
market betas and accounting betas. A study by Wichern and Haugen [1975] 
also indicated a relationship between leverage and the stability of stock 
prices. Ben-Zion and Shalit [1975] found that leverage as well as size 
and dividend record were important determinants of equity risk. Melicher 
[1974] found that, in addition to betas being significantly and positively 
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related to market activity of the common stock, as financial leverage 
increased, the imoact on risk as denoted by estimated betas occurred at 
an increasing rather than a constant rate. 
A study by Ball [1972] dealt with market activity surrounding a 
number of types of accounting changes. He found that, while there was no 
indication of abnormal returns in the months around the changes, there 
were changes in the risk characteristics for firms in his sample. 
Bildersee [1975] cites further evidence of an association between beta 
coefficients and several traditional measures of asset composition and 
leverage. Additional studies by Gonedes [1973] and Breen and Lerner [1973] 
found similar results. 
Recent evidence reported by Elgers [1980] disputes some earlier 
findings of the superiority of the inclusion of accounting-based risk 
measures in models predicting systematic risk of equity securities. Elgers 
found that accounting risk measures did not improve upon market-based 
systematic risk predictions. Earlier results are reinterpreted as resulting 
from statistical problems in the methodology. 
As a whole, the evidence is impressive in support of at least the 
contemporaneous association between accounting information and market- 
determined risk measures. Until recently, however, little attention had 
been given to a theoretical justification for this association. Several 
authors have considered this recently. Lev [1974b] demonstrated a theo¬ 
retical relationship between operating leverage and risk. Hamada [1972] 
developed a theoretical argument for the association of leverage as a 
risk measure with market risk. This relationship is implicit in the Miller 
and Modigliani (MM) capital structure hypothesis; that is, the market- 
related measures of systematic risk of firms in a given risk class should 
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vary iwth their capital structures. Hamada empirically tested this relation¬ 
ship and concludes "if the MM corporate leverage proposals are correct, 
then approximately 21 to 24 percent of observed systematic risk of common 
stocks, when averaged over 304 firms, can be explained merely by the 
added financial risk taken on by the underlying firm with its use of 
debt and preferred stock. Corporate leverage does count considerably." 
In a more recent paper. Bowman [1978] developed a theoretical model that 
demonstrated financial leverage and its relationship to systematic risk. 
In addition, under somewhat restrictive assumptions, it was shown that 
systematic risk is not a function of earnings variability, growth, firm 
size or dividend policy. Although developed in a different manner, the 
theoretical model developed by Bowman is consistent with Hamada's argument. 
Empirical Research n the Issue of Leasing 
The empirical work on the issue of accounting for leases has been 
relatively sparse, at least until recently. Studies have typically addressed 
the question of whether different methods of accounting for leases, or 
changes in the method of accounting for leases has had any substantial 
effect on either stock prices or systematic common stock risk. 
Ro [1978] investigated the information content of accounting lease 
disclosures mandated by the SEC in ASR 147. He found that capitalized 
lease disclosures, as mandated by ASR 147, did significantly affect the 
distribution of security returns. In addition, he found that firms dis¬ 
closing both a balance sheet and income effect of capitalizing leased 
assets, and that high beta firms were more affected than low beta firms. 
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Ro did not consider the effect of the disclosure requirements on the 
systematic risk of the firms. 
Martin, Anderson and Keown [1979] studied seventeen firms that 
capitalized lease commitments during the years 1966-1974. Using a CAR 
analysis they were unable to find any significant market reaction in terms 
of the firms' security returns. They were further unable to detect any 
significant risk changes for the firms studied. The focus of that study 
was the voluntary capitalization of lease commitments and it did not 
directly consider the impact of an accounting policy decision such as 
ASR 147 or SFAS 13, although the evidence is presented as bearing upon 
such decisions. Several limitations with regard to the sample used and 
methodology employed draw into question the extent to which the results 
can be taken as supporting the conclusion drawn: that there was no market 
reaction to the capitalization of leases. 
A recent study by Bownan [1980] attempted to assess the debt equi¬ 
valence of leases. Bowman, using a theoretical model developed earlier 
[Bowman, 1979], tests whether the information on the present values of 
lease capitalization is impounded into the market-based measures of 
systematic risk. With a sample of 92 firms in 7 industries, Bownan tests 
a multiple regression using market risk as the dependent variable and an 
accounting beta, a debt-to-equity ratio and a leases-to-equity ratio as 
independent variables. After controlling for the problem of multi- 
colinearity, Bownan found that leases were significantly associated with 
market risk. One problem with the theoretical formulations implicit in 
the methodology is the strong form of market efficiency that is assumed. 
This assumption is unwarranted. Evidence reported by Jaffe [1974] and 
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Finnerty [1976] does not support the efficient market hypothesis in the 
strong form. 
Bhamornsiri [1979] approached the same issue as Bowman and, using a 
different methodology, arrived at the conclusion that lease captialization 
as a method of disclosure was not more relevant than alternative methods 
of disclosure. These results, while not directly contradictory to Bowman's 
conclusions, are difficult to reconcile with Bowman's result except for 
methodical reasons. Further results reported by Bhamornsiri suggest no 
change in the level of systematic risk for leasing firms as a result of 
either APB Opinion 31 or ASR 147. 
Another recent study by Finnerty, Fitzsimmons and Oliver [1980] 
considers the impact of lease capitalization, as per ASR 147 and as per 
SFAS 13, upon the systematic risk of certain companies whose balance 
sheets were most dramatically affected by the pronouncements. Using the 
Chow test methodology, they were unable to find a significant effect for 
most firms studied. However, because of the low power of the Chow test 
to detect relatively small shifts in beta when analysis is done on indi¬ 
vidual securities, their evidence cannot be considered conclusive. 
Pfeiffer [1980] studied the economic effects of lease accounting 
using agency theory as a theoretical approach and employing the Arbitrage 
Pricing Model (APM) which he argued to be more general than the CAPM. He 
did find a significant security price effect associated with SFAS 13. The 
strength of the effect appeared to be related to the effect of capitali¬ 
zation on loan agreements and the renegotiation of those agreements. In 
addition he found the most significant date associated with SFAS 13 to 
be the November 1974 public hearings. 
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Two major research projects have addressed the leasing issue in some 
detail. Ferrara, Thies and Dirsmith [1980] studied the lease-purchase 
decision itself, and the potential impact of SFAS 13 on that decision in 
a study commissioned by the National Association of Accountants, while 
Abdel-Khalik, et al. [1981] studied the various effects of lease account¬ 
ing as prescribed by SFAS 13 in a major project commissioned by the FASB. 
Ferrara, Thies and Dirsmith [1980] reached several conclusions with 
potential importance to the current research. In general, firms with high 
leverage and low profit were most likely to be involved in leasing. Smaller 
firms or firms financially weaker in terms of leverage, profit and liquid¬ 
ity were found to pursue leasing for different reasons than larger firms. 
Small firms cited flexibility, working capital conservation, financing 
restrictions and off-balance sheet financing as important considerations 
in the leasing decision. Larger firms and more financially sound firms 
tended to stress implicit interest costs, obsolescence and income taxes 
as factors which were important in their decisions. Ferrara, Thies, and 
Dirsmith also draw the following conclusions: 
FASB No. 13 was not, in general, expected to have much 
of an impact; however, in the case of U.S. firms, those 
firms most vulnerable to FASB No. 13 (high leverage, 
low profit, and weak current ratio) did anticipate more 
impact on their lease-purchase decisions and their FASB 
No. 13 circumvention activities, (p. 71) 
They also report that bond raters strongly felt that there would be no 
impact on bond ratings from SFAS 13 since the raters were already capital¬ 
izing the leases in their analyses. 
The FASB commissioned Study of the Effects of Accounting for Leases 
(SEAL) by Abdel-Khalik et al. addressed the issue of a market reaction 
to SFAS 13 and considered the possibility of managerial action in response 
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to the prescriptions of SFAS 13. In their analyses Abdel -Khalik developed 
a rationale for managers' taking certain actions to reduce the apparent 
impact of SFAS 13 on their financial statements, and identified the 
following set of actions [pp. 44-45]. 
1) actions to increase owners' equity 
--e.g. early conversion of bonds to stocks, 
2) actions to reduce long term debt 
—e.g. early retirement of such debt, 
3) actions to reduce total assets 
--e.g. early retirement of long term debt, 
4) actions to reduce leasing 
—e.g. increase purchasing, 
5) actions to increase income 
--e.g. reducing discretionary expenses. 
In their subsequent analyses, they consider the effect of SFAS 13 and 
managerial actions on the structure of financial statements as if complete 
capitalization of the leases were in effect. These analyses involve study 
of trends, profiles and financial group memberships. Later analysis focuses 
on the aggregate effects on the market's equilibrium price of common stock 
and market-based systematic risk of SFAS 13. A tentative conclusion at 
which they arrived was that a number of companies with substantial lease 
commitments appear to have taken actions that are infrequent and unusual, 
consisting mainly of changes in financial decisions, and that these 
actions could be attributed to responses to lease capitalization. In 
addition, based on study of firms in three heavy leasing industries, air¬ 
lines, fast food chains, and retailers, they conclude that firms identi¬ 
fied as having taken mangerial actions to mollify the effects of SFAS 13 
on debt ratios did have significantly greater declines in systematic risk 
than did firms not taking such action. It was the belief of Abdel-Khalik 
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et al. that the actions taken by those firms were made more appealing if 
not primarily motivated by the effects of SFAS 13. 
Much of the research to date on the effects of lease accounting 
policy decisions has been contradictory or tenuous in its conclusions. 
The SEAL project, of most recent origin, has begun to focus the research 
effort toward an assessment of the full impact of the new standards and 
an understanding of that impact. It is the extension of this research 
objective that is to be pursued by the current research. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH ISSUES, OBJECTIVES AND SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION 
As discussed earlier, the purpose of this research is to identify and 
examine any economic consequences resulting from the policy decisions on 
the lease disclosure issue made by authoritative bodies responsible for 
prescribing accounting standards. Economic consequences might take any of 
several forms: 
1) corporate management may take action in response to required account¬ 
ing changes to circumvent the new accounting rules, or may actually 
alter investment or financing decisions; 
2) capital market participants may react to new information made avail¬ 
able as a result of the required accounting change; 
3) capital market participants may react to the actions taken by 
management; 
4) capital market participants may anticipate management actions in 
response to the changed accounting standard. 
Accounting changes discussed earlier may be identified as either dis¬ 
cretionary or mandatory and as either cosmetic or substantive. Since the 
type of accounting changes being considered in this research is a result 
of action taken by a standard setting body, it is the mandatory-cosmetic 
and mandatory-substantive categories which are important for this research. 
Accounting changes which are mandatory but cosmetic still might have real 
economic consequences if management takes action to circumvent new standards 
and capital markets react to or anticipate such management action. Accounting 




quences becuase of a change in the information set available to market 
participants, because of management action or because of capital market 
reaction to or anticipation of management action. 
The two changes in accounting disclosure requirements being considered, 
ASR 147 and SFAS 13 are clearly mandatory, but whether either is cosmetic • 
rather than substantive is less clear. ASR 147 did require the disclosure 
of information in 10-K reports filed by lessees with the SEC which may not 
have been publicly available prior to ASR 147. While this information, the 
net present value of non-capitalized financing leases and pro forma effect 
on net income had the leases been capitalized, might have no effect on cash 
flows, it did represent information about the capital structures of firms 
affected by the ruling, which might affect the market's assessment of firms' 
riskiness. Whether such information regarding the leases was available from 
alternative sources, such as financial analysts, is not clear. SFAS 13 did 
not require the disclosure of new information, only that information pre¬ 
viously provided as supplemental disclosures be moved to the body of the 
financial statements. In that sense, SFAS 13 would be considered cosmetic, 
but there is some evidence [Abdel-Khalik, 1981] that indicates lessee firms 
may not have been fully complying with ASR 147 prior to the issuance of 
SFAS 13, so that the SFAS 13 disclosures may have revealed some new infor¬ 
mation on the affected firms' capital structures. 
Within this framework, the following research issues are presented: 
1) Can actions be identified which were undertaken in response to ASR 
147 and SFAS 13 by firms which were affected by those pronouncements? 
2) Can an abnormal reaction be identified in the returns and systematic 
risk of the common stock of firms affected by ASR 147 and SFAS 13? 
3) Can any observed market reaction be explained either by underlying 
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characteristics of individual firms or by actions undertaken by 
the management of those affected firms? 
An investigation of the preceding questions should provide further 
information on several aspects of the economic consequences of the accounting 
standards setting process. If policy decisions requiring changes in account¬ 
ing methods are related to management's choice of investment opportunities 
or financing methods, then even those required accounting changes which 
are apparently cosmetic may have real consequences for the firms affected. 
Evidence on the consequences of such policy decisions may be useful to policy 
makers if they believe that the possible impact of policy decisions should 
be explicitly considered in their decision-making process.4 Perhaps more 
importantly the management of firms affected by accounting standards may 
find the information useful in assessing their positions on and response 
to various standards. 
Research Problem 
A number of authors (Abdel-Khalik et al. [1981], Dieter [1979], Inberman, 
Ronen and Sorter [1979], Phalen [1978], Davidson and Weil [1975]) repre¬ 
senting both the academic world and the business community have suggested 
that the effects of SFAS 13 would be undesirable in the eyes of management. 
Most of those authors seemed to believe that the chief negative consequence 
from the perspective of management would be the apparent deterioration of 
the debt-to-equity ratios or the financial leverage of the firms affected. 
Barron's, in 1977, reported some of the negative sentiment felt in the business 
and financial community; among the greatest concerns expressed were that 
the curtailment of credit lines and the contraction of expansion plans 
might result. Dieter [1979] felt that, in response to SFAS 13, many firms 
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would seek to circumvent the spirit of the statement using third party 
guarantees of residual values to assure that leases qualify as "operating 
leases" to the lessee. Abdel-Khalik et al. [1981] enumerated a series of 
possible actions that management might undertake in order to mollify the 
effects of SFAS 13 on financial statements. These have been discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
In light of the prior research in the academic literature and the 
speculation in the popular financial media it was felt that sufficient 
reason exists to pursue the impact of lease accounting requirements on 
firms affected by ASR 147 and SFAS 13. Studies of other accounting policy 
decisions have pursued the issue of the impact of a decision mandating a 
change in accounting methods or disclosures in several ways. Dukes, Dyckman 
and Elliot [1980] and Horowitz and Kolodny [1980] considered the effects 
of SFAS 2, Accounting for Research and Development Costs, on variables 
reflecting corporate research and development decisions. Lev [1979], Collins 
and Dent [1979] and Dyckman and Smith [1979] have studied the capital market 
impact of policy decisions regarding oil and gas accounting methods, the 
proposed SFAS 19. Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal [1980] have pursued capital 
market reactions one step further by examining explanatory theories for 
the market reaction to the oil and gas accounting proposals. 
While research regarding policy decisions on lease disclosure and 
accounting has addressed several of the issues relating to corporate decisions 
and capital market reaction, there has been no full development of a theory 
or of models to explain capital market reaction, if any, in terms of corporate 
decisions or underlying firm characteristics. It is that avenue that is 
explored in this research project. 
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• “ Sample Identification 
The research project involves three research questions. To restate 
them, they are: 
1) Can actions be identified which were undertaken in response to ASR 
147 and SFAS 13 by firms which were affected by those pronouncements? 
2) Can an abnormal reaction be identified in the returns and systematic 
risk of the common stock of firms affected by ASR 147 and SFAS 13? 
3) Can any observed market reaction be explained either by underlying 
characteristics of individual firms or by actions undertaken by 
the management of those affected firms? 
Since the sample of firms selected for study is largely the same for each 
research issue, this discussion precedes the discussions of the methodology 
used for each research question0 
An experimental sample was necessary for each accounting pronouncement, 
ASR 147 and SFAS 13, that was studied. For this sample, firms were selected 
which had relatively large amounts of noncapitalized financing leases in 
the year of the accounting policy decision. For ASR 147 the year used was 
1973 and for SFAS 13 the year used was 1975.5 Firms selected for the two 
experimental groups were not required to be the same firms for both pro¬ 
nouncements nor were firms in one experimental sample specifically excluded 
from the other.6 For this study the criterion used to define relatively 
large amounts of leases was the present value of noncapitalized financing 
leases exceeding 5% of reported total assets before capitalization of the 
1 easeso This is one threshold for materiality of leases suggested by Abdel- 
Khalik, et al. [1981]„7 The firms were selected from firms with data available 
on the Compustat Price, Dividend and Earnings (PDE) and Industrial data 
bases and on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data bases. 
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In addition, further information and data was obtained using the AICPA's 
Accounting Trends and Techniques, Value Line Investor's Surveys and the 
SEC's Disclosure Journal. 
For this study, and others which study accounting policy decisions, 
it is important to identify an appropriate sample of control firms which 
are as similar as possible to the experimental group of firms under study. 
In studies of accounting policy making, firms which are affected by a parti¬ 
cular decision are self-selected into the experimental group. Foster [1980] 
discusses this problem in detail, and recommends some procedures to assess 
differences between experimental and control samples, other than the variable 
under study, that may confound results. The firm profile analysis that Foster 
recommends is discussed in further detail after discussion and presentation 
of the matching procedure employed. 
In this study, the dependent variables under consideration in the first 
two parts are, respectively, variables reflecting changes in financing policy 
for the sample firms and variables reflecting security returns and changes 
in the systematic risk. A logical control group would be one with firms 
similar to the experimental firms, except for the choice of the method 
employed to account for financing leases. Consequently, the control firms 
selected were those having substantial capitalized leases, but as similar 
as possible to the experimental firms on other factors that might affect 
the observations on the dependent variables. The variables selected for 
matching attempt to control for the potential confounding effects associated 
with differences in industry, firm size, relative risk and financial leverage. 
Although it is desirable to match firms on as many aspects as possible, 
a limited number of matching variables must be used so that samples of 
reasonable size may be obtained. Further procedures can be undertaken, as 
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Foster [1980], suggests, to determine if any significant differences exist 
between the group of firms on important variables not included inthe match¬ 
ing procedures. The reasons for the selection of industry, firm size, relative 
risk and financial leverage as matching variables are discussed subsequently. 
Theoretical work by Modigliani and Miller [1958] and empirical research 
by King [1966] and Fertuck [1975] suggests the possibility of an industry 
effect with respect to security price behavior. In light of this evidence, 
it was felt that industry differences could contribute to observed differ¬ 
ences between the experimental group and control group if not taken into 
account. 
The possible effects of firm size are discussed by Watts and Zimmerman 
[1978] and Banz [1979]. Watts and Zimmerman suggest that political and 
information production costs are different for smaller than for larger firms, 
and Banz suggests that investors require a higher rate of return for small 
firms which are relatively unknown and which have higher information costs. 
Although results presented by Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal [1980] and are 
not consistent with Banz' findings, it was felt that sufficient question 
exists regarding firm size to control for that factor. 
Gonedes and Dopuch [1974] and Gonedes [1975] note that relative risk 
is important in any study of the market consequences of new information. 
In addition, evidence presented by Blume [1975, 1979] and Elgers, Haltiner 
and Hawthorne [1979] suggests that for a number of reasons ordinary least 
squares estimates of beta regress toward a mean of one. Different relative 
risk for experimental versus control firms could explain observed differences 
in dependent variables, therefore firms will be matched on this variable. 
Hamada [1972] and Bowman [1979] have shown a theoretical link between finan¬ 
cial leverage and systematic risk, and Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes [1970], 
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Beaver and Manegold [1975], Elgers [1980] and Bowman [1980] have all shown 
an empirical relationship between market risk and financial leverage. In 
light of this evidence, financial leverage was chosen as a variable on which 
to matcho Additionally, changes in financial leverage undertaken by each 
firm will be a dependent variable studied in this research. 
The variables used in the matching procedure are defined as follows: 
1) For industry, a four-digit Compustat Industrial Classification Code;8 
2) For firm size, total assets reported in the balance sheet in the 
year of the accounting pronouncement; 
3) For systematic risk, the beta coefficient from the market model, 
with the adjustment suggested by Vasicek [1973];9 
4) For financial leverage, the carrying value of total liabilities 
and preferred stock divided by the carrying value of total 
liabilities and preferred stock plus the market value of common 
equity. 
With respect to the measurement of these variables, each is, to some 
extent, an imperfect measure of the factors which they are designed to cap¬ 
ture. Each has been employed in prior research. Abdel-Khalik, et al. [1980] 
used four digit SIC codes and total assets as paritioning variables in their 
study of SFAS 13, to reflect industry and firm size respectively. Bownan 
[1980] uses the market model beta as a surrogate measure for CAPM systematic 
risk, and notes that, while it is not without measurement error, this is 
not a realtively troublesome issue.10 In addition. Bowman [1980] and Elgers 
and Murray [1981] use a hybrid definition of financial leverage incorporating 
book values for debt and market values for common equity. 
The procedure employed to implement the matching of these initial samples 
was the identification of a group of potential match firms from the Compustat 
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data base within each industry as defined by the four digit industry classi¬ 
fication code, but consisting of firms with lease comnitments capitalized. 
Each firm was matched with its closest match from among the potential match 
p 
firms based upon a minimization of the Mahalanobis distance measure D . 
p 
The D measure was used to compute the distance of each potential match 
firm from the experimental firm on the three latter matching variables, 
as defined previously: 
1) total assets 
2) systematic risk (beta) 
3) financial leverage. 
2 
The distance measure employed is Mahalanobis1 D : 
°2 = ^Xik ‘ xjk)' Ck ^Hk ‘ Xok) ^ 
where 
x- is the vector of variable scores for each potential 
experimental firm i 
x- is the vector of variable scores for each potential 
J 
match firm j 
C?1 is the variance-coverance matrix within the cross- 
k 
section of firms.11 
2 
Each firm was matched with the potential match firm with the minimum D 
score within that industry. Table 2 presents the results of the matching 
procedure for ASR 147 sample firms and Table 3 presents the results for 
SFAS 13 sample firms. For ASR 147, a total of 23 matches were produced and 
for SFAS 13, a total of 46 matches were produced. It should be noted that 
not every potential experimental firm was matched and not every potential 
match firm selected because in some industries there were many more potential 

























ASR 147 SAMPLES 
2 
Experimental Firm Matched Firm D_ 
Kane Miller 
Fieldcrest Mills 
Hart, Schaffner & Marx 




















Iowa Beef Processors .065 
Springs Mills .473 
Jonathan Logan .494 
Garan Inc. .225 
Interco Inc. .348 
Papercraft Corp. 1.092 
Rohmand Haas 1.408 
Dayco Corp. 2.250 
Firestone Tire .127 
Guardian Inds. 2.290 
Ideal Basic Inds. .201 
Gifford Hill & Co. .087 
Bliss & Laughlin Inds.1.202 
Lukens Steel .012 
National Steel .921 
Revere Copper & Brass .134 
Sta-Rite Inds. .391 
Reece Corp. 1.165 
King Radio 1.648 
Kysor Industrial .296 
United Industrial .687 
Alaska Interstate 1.591 












































SFAS 13 SAMPLES 
Experimental Firm Matched Firm D2 
Consolidated Foods Quaker Oats .168 
Rath Packing Valmac .868 
Staley Mfg. American Maize Products .159 
West Point Pepperal Riegel Textile .581 
Billy the Kid Jonathan Logan .535 
Damon Creations Superior .081 
Manhattan Inds. Salant .313 
Noel Inds. Decorator Inds. .612 
Phillips Van Heusen House of Ronnie .882 
Piedmont Inds. Movie Star .196 
Puritan Fashions Palm Beach .669 
Golden West Homes Kit Mfg. 1.680 
APL Corp. Dennison Mfg. 1.193 
Duplex Prods. Ennis Business Forms .456 
Pantasote Inc. Reichold Chemicals 2.243 
Helene Curtis Faberge 1.989 
Ashland Oil Cities Service 2.984 
Armstrong Rubber Mohawk .140 
Cellucraft Monagram .190 
Robintech Voplex .802 
Hofmann Inds. Allegheny Ludlum 1.155 
National Can Van Dorn 1.534 
Brooks & Perkins Nucor .322 
Republic Philips .089 
Esterl ine Acme Cleveland 1.994 
Scott & Fetzer National Mine .075 
Gould UV Inds. .773 
Moog Barnes Engineering 2.495 
Analog Devices Veeco .308 
International Rectifier Electro Audio Dynamics 1.577 
Arrow Automotive Howel1 .476 
Intermark Federal Mogul 1.200 
Whitaker Cable Kysor Industrial .211 
Mattel Medalist Inds. 2.772 
Banner Inds. Golden Cycle Corp. .163 
Spector Telecom Corp. .019 
Action Inds. Clark Consolidated Inds. .022 
Sterling Electronics Arrow Electronics 1.176 
SMD Inds. Universal Leaf Tobacco 1.477 
Gray Drug Cunningham Drugs 1.153 
Payless Drug Stores Revco Drug Stores .346 
Jewel cor Medco Jewelry 2.163 
Suburban Propane DWG Corp. 2.630 
Bolt, Beranek & Newnan Chilton Corp. 1.480 
Cenco Beverly Enterprises 2.348 
Huntingdon Health Humane Inc. .319 
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opposite held true.12 
As an additional control procedure, following Foster's [1980] suggestion, 
a non-parametric analysis was conducted of firm financial profiles. This 
was included to evaluate further the effectiveness of the matching procedure 
and because, as Foster notes, in controlling for firm profile differences, 
research should concentrate on: 
1) alternative theories as to why the accounting policy decision 
might have the impact being studied, and 
2) alternative models as to how capital asset prices are determined. 
The firm profile analysis considered the following variables: 
1) total assets 
2) systematic risk, as previously defined 
3) financial leverage 
4) current ratio 
5) dividend yield as defined by: 
Cash dividends on common shares 
Market value of common shares 
outstanding at fiscal year end.13 
The first three of these were the matching variables discussed earlier, 
and are included for that reason. The current ratio is included because 
evidence cited by Ferrara, Thies and Dirsmith [1980] indicates that the 
firms most likely to alter lease-purchase decisions as a result of SFAS 
13 were financially weaker firms in terms of leverage and liquidity. 
Finally, dividend yield is included as a means of partially controlling 
for the possibility that dividend yield may be a determinant of security 
returns (Brennan [1973]; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy [1979]). 
The firm profile analysis as suggested by Foster [1980] consisted of 
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the Mann-Whitney U test, discussed by Hollander and Wolfe [1973], to 
test differences between the experimental and control groups on those 
variables. The Mann-Whitney U test is a non-parametric test for differences 
between groups on the median of variables. The results, presented in 
Table 4, indicate no significant differences between the experimental 
and control groups on any of the variables tested at the .05 level of 
significance, although for the SFAS 13 samples, the experimental and 
matched group were significantly different on the dividend yield variable 
at the .10 level of significance. This provides some evidence that the 
firms in each group of matched samples are similar on these variables 
in the years prior to the release of the accounting pronouncements being 
studied. 
Finally, it was felt that, in order to strengthen the analysis of 
the second and third research issues under consideration, and to facilitate 
comparison of results and conclusions with other studies of the mandatory 
lease capitalization issue, a supplemental sample of firms could be identi¬ 
fied from samples used in prior studies of the effects of SFAS 13. Drawing 
on samples reported by Finnerty, Fitzsimmons and Oliver [1980] and Abdel-Khalik 
et al. [1981], a sample was identified of 60 additional firms having 




Firm Profile Analysis 
Non-Capitalizing Firms Control Firms 
ASR 147 (1973) Mean Median Mean Median 
Z Statistic for 
Mann-Whitne.y 
*Total Assets 427.423 180.749 496.350 152.913 0.417 
Debt Ratio .658 .693 .582 .603 1.560 
Systematic Risk 1.22 1.19 1.12 1.08 0.699 
Current Ratio 2.579 2.290 2.680 2.354 0.534 
Dividend Yield 0.044 0.048 0.046 0.052 0.291 
SPAS 13 (1975) 
*Total Assets 166.720 58.000 193.280 73.600 0.916 
Debt Ratio .675 .713 .673 .698 0.659 
Systematic Risk 1.18 1.18 1.15 1.20 0.066 
Current Ratio 2.269 2.089 2.504 2.350 1.106 
Dividend Yield 0.0216 0.0153 0.0361 0.0304 1.8461 
* in MM $ 
* significant at .10 level of 
♦ 
significance 
None significant at .05 
CHAPTER IV 
TESTS OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL AND LEASING VARIABLES 
Research Question 
The first question to be examined by this study is whether the 
managements of firms affected by ASR 147 and SFAS 13 took any action, such 
as changing financing or investment decisions, in response to policy 
decisions. To address this question, it is necessary to analyze the nature 
of possible management action. One place to start this analysis is with 
the opinions expressed by the popular financial media. 
In a November 1977 article, Barron's reported some of the negative 
sentiment felt by the accounting profession and business leaders. Among 
the greatest fears expressed were the curtailment of credit lines and 
the contraction of expansion plans. Many articles [Phalen, 1978; Ingberman, 
Ronen and Sorter, 1979; Davidson and Weil, 1975] tend to identify the chief 
negative consequences, in the view of management, as the effect upon the 
financial leverage or debt/equity ratios of the firms affected. It is 
these apparently cosmetic consequences that have attracted the most attention 
in the press. 
The other major effect, and a possible source of negative sentiment, 
is the effect of lease capitalization on income, which is not as predictable 
as the apparent effect on leverage. Ingberman, Ronen and Sorter suggest, 
however, that under most circumstances, operating income will decrease 
under lease capitalization, at least initially, and this coupled with the 
increase in total assets could adversely affect return on investment and 
other profitability measures. It is interesting to note that some further 
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reasons, as reported by Abdel-Khalik, et al. for opposition to SFAS 13 
were that lease capitalization would adversely affect certain internal 
operating systems and require a major internal reorganization and re¬ 
structuring of the budget system. 
The major effects discussed in the financial press were the two 
cosmetic effects: 
1) apparently increased financial risk and 
2) apparently decreased profitability. 
It is unlikely that management would either recognize or acknowledge 
those effects as being cosmetic since it seems that many non-academics 
either do not understand or do not accept the efficient markets hypothesis 
[Mayer-Sommer, 1980]. 
Given this assessment, it may by hypothesized that managerial action 
taken in response to either ASR 147 or SFAS 13 would attempt to minimize 
the apparent effect on financial statements. Actions suggested by Abdel- 
Khalik, et al. were actions to lower the debt to equity ratio. This was 
found by Abdel-Khalik to have occurred for certain firms affected by SFAS 
13. Firms could accomplish this in a variety of ways which were discussed 
earlier. Other management responses to either pronouncement might involve 
changes in the lease-purchase decisions, buying instead of leasing, 
[Ferrara, Thies and Dirsmith, 1980] and restructuring of existing leases 
or structuring of new leases so as to circumvent the accounting statements 




Since the question addressed in this first section of the research 
is what effect these accounting standards may have had on managerial 
decisions with regard to financing and investment policy, the appropriate 
dependent variables analyzed would be financial variables reflecting 
changes in financing and investment policy from the period prior to the 
accounting pronouncement to periods thereafter. Therefore, the data used 
reflected changes from 1973 to 1974, 1975 and 1976 for the ASR 147 sample 
and changes from 1975 to 1977, 1978, and 1979. These years were chosen 
because formulation of ASR 147 took place during 1973, with its provisions 
taking effect in November 1973, and formulation of SFAS 13 occurred during 
1975 and 1976, with the effective date being January 1977. 
In light of evidence previously cited Barron1s [1977], Dieter [1979], 
Ferrara, Thies and Dirsmith [1980], and Abdel-Khalik et al. [1981], it was 
felt that the important financial variables for study should attempt to 
reflect changes in financing decisions and in lease-purchase decisions. 
One ratio was used to assess changes in the financial structure of the 
samples of firms and two variables reflecting leasing were studied: 
z change in the book value of debt to total assets ratio1- 
X2 = percentage change in the present value10 of financing lease 
commitments 
x^ = percentage change in rental expense. 
The operational definition of these measures is as follows: 
*1 - 
Book Value of Debt + Preferred Stock' 
Total Assets t + i 
Xo = 
’Book Value of Debt + Preferred Stock' 
Total Assets 
PV financing leases^ + PV financing leases^ 
PV financing leases. 
Xo = 
Rent Expense^ + ^ — Rent Expense^. 
Rent Expense 
The data used was gathered largely from the Compustat Industrial file 
supplemented with 10-K reports filed by the companies with the SEC. 
Hypotheses and Data Analysis 
For each accounting pronouncement studied there were two samples 
non-capitalizing group and a matched control group. In analyzing this 
2 
data, the Hotelling T procedure for testing the significance of the 
difference between the centroids of matched samples was used. 




X£1 ‘ Hz 
(N) (c) 







i = 23 for ASR 147 
46 for SFAS 13 
J - 3 (7) 
(N) = noncapitalizing firms 
(C) = control firms 
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The mean difference vector is the centroid of difference scores and is 
the same as the difference between the centroids of the two matched 
samples: 
N 
d = z d./M 
^ i=\ ^ N (8) 
where N is the number of matched pairs in each group of samples. 
The hypothesis which will be tested in that the population centroid 
difference scores is the null vector and, according to Tatsuoka [1971] 
2 
the appropriate test statistic is the Hotelling [1931] T , a multivariate 
2 
extension of the univariate t statistic. Hotelling's T is: 
9 23 for ASR 147 
T = N(N - 1) d'Sd d N = 46 for SFAS 13 ^ 
where is the sums-of-squares and cross-products 
matrix and 
N - P T2 . rP P = 3 
(n"T)p t * fn-p 
where P is the number of difference scores in the 
vectors. 
The general hypothesis to be tested is that there is no difference 
between noncapitalizing firms and their matched counterparts with respect 
to the changes in the variables reflecting the financing and leasing 
policies of the firms. 
Specifically, the hypotheses are these: 
Ho: = 0 for ASR 147 matched samples 
Ha: ^d ^ 0 for ASR 147 matched samples 
and 
Hq: ud = 0 for SFAS 13 matched samples 





The results of the Hotelling T tests are summarized in Table 5. For 
the ASR 147 test periods no significant differences were found between the 
experimental group and control group on the variables studied: changes in 
the book value of debt to total assets17, changes in rental expense and 
changes in the present value of financial leases. For the SFAS 13 test periods, 
however, the results are indicative of differences between the noncapital¬ 
izing firms and the capitalizing firms on financing and leasing policies. 
Specifically, the F statistic for the 1975 to 1978 test period is statistic¬ 
ally significant at the .05 level of significance and the F statistic for 
1975 to 1979 is significant at .0118, indicating that for selected samples 
of experimental and matched control firms the null hypothesis of no difference 
between the two groups may be rejected for the 1975 to 1978 period and 
the 1975 to 1979 period. 
This evidence indicates that for the firms affected by the SEC's ASR 
147 ruling, no significant changes in financing or leasing policy were 
detectable. This result is not surprising in that there were no indications 
in popular financial media that managers of affected firms viewed ASR 147 
as threatening. Apparently, the belief was that such supplemental disclosure, 
confined to 10-K reports and footnotes to financial statements, would not 
affect firms' ability to obtain further capital. Although some empirical 
evidence (Ro [1977]) indicates that security prices of firms making supple¬ 
mental disclosures under ASR 147 were affected by that ruling, there is 
no evidence indicating that the management of those firms took any action 
in response to it, since prior research has not addressed this issue. 
In contrast, for SFAS 13, reports in the financial press bore out 
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TABLE 5 
HOTELLING T2 TEST RESULTS 
Test Period -- ASR 147 1 F Statistic Critical F* 
1973 - 1974 2.879 .872 4.94 
1973 - 1975 7.099 2.151 4.94 
1973 - 1976 9.447 2.863 4.94 
Test Period — SFAS 13 i F Statistic Critical F* 
1975 - 1977 5.1543 1.642 4.31 
1975 - 1978 13.2687 4.226^ 4.31 
1975 - 1979 14.9076 4.721^ 4.35 
* Critical F Statistics: 
3 
20 

















Significant at the .05 level of significance 
Significant at the .01 level of significance 
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the suppostion that the management of affected firms would view SFAS 13 
in a negative light, fearing the curtailment of credit lines and a negative 
reaction in the capital markets resulting from the apparent deterioration 
of debt to equity ratios. Evidence presented by Abdel-Khalik et al. [1981] 
indicated that many firms did take action to mollify the effects of SFAS 
13 on financial statements, and the results from this study add further 
support to this assertion. In light of the strong negative reactions by 
affected firms to SFAS 13, the results presented here, suggesting changes 
in financing and leasing policy on the part of the affected firms, are 
not surprising. Further consideration is given to these issues in 
subsequent chapters as it bears upon capital market reaction and the 
proposed explanatory model of market reaction. 
CHAPTER V 
TESTS OF CAPITAL MARKET REACTION TO ASR 147 AND SFAS 13 
A second major issue to be addressed is the capital market reaction 
associated with the policy decisions on leasing, ASR 147 and SFAS 13. As 
noted before, the empirical findings with regard to either policy decision 
have varied in claiming the presence or lack of market reaction. Ro<[1978] 
claims to have found a reaction to ASR 147, while Finnerty, Fitzsimmons 
and Oliver [1980] are unable to find a reaction to SFAS 13. Abdel-Khalik, 
et al. [1981] do note a market reaction after partitioning of their sample 
into subsamples based upon the action or non-action of management in response 
to SFAS 13. 
Pfeiffer [1980] finds a market reaction using the Arbitrage Pricing 
Model at the time of the initial public hearings on SFAS 13. In addition, 
those studies finding, or claiming to find market reactions have differed 
with regard to the time of the market reaction, and with regard to possible 
explanations of the capital market reaction. 
Sifting through the economic theory and empirical evidence thus far, 
on economic consequences of accounting policy decisions, three possible 
explanations emerge for a capital market reaction to either ASR 147 or 
SFAS 13: 
1) new information available to the market as a result of the required 
accounting change; 
2) management action (causing the capital market response); and 
3) anticipation by capital market participants of management response 
to the required change. 
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The new information available is usually discussed in the accounting 
literature in terms of changes in expected cash flows as a result of tax 
implications of an accounting change. However, it is also possible to discuss 
new information about the firm which has no tax implication or potential 
cash flow effect. Simmonds and Collins [1978] discuss the implications 
of the SECs requirement during the late 1960s of line-of-business disclosures 
This requirement, while having no tax or cash flow consequences, could 
have an information impact on the market with regard to the systematic 
risk of the common stock of affected firms. Given the models devleoped 
by Hamada [1972], Lev [1974b] and Bowman [1979], a similar case might be 
argued for ASR 147 increased disclosure requirements. For SFAS 13, the 
most likely source of a capital market reaction would be either managerial 
action of some sort or the markets' anticipation thereof. 
A final important point of discussion before proceeding with the data, 
analysis and design, is the timing in each case (ASR 147, SFAS 13) of any 
possible market reaction. Since the available evidence on market efficiency 
suggests that information is impounded in security prices very quickly 
after becoming publicly available, and since statistical problems exist, 
for many of the tests to be used, when the critical point of market reaction 
is incorrectly specified, it is desirable to try to identify the most likely 
point of market reaction to each policy decision. The following is a list 
of potential critical points for each policy decision: 
ASR 147: 
June 6, 1973: 
October 5, 1973: 






August 26, 1975: 
July 22, 1976: 
December 2, 1976: 
January 1, 1977: 
August 31, 1977: 
First Exposure Draft 
Revised Exposure Draft 
SFAS 13 (press release)19 
SFAS 13 (effective date) 
ASR 225 adopted20 
These possible critical events and dates are suggested by Ro [1978] for 
ASR 147 and Abdel-Khalik, et al., [1980] for SFAS 13. 
Having discussed the justification and timing of a possible market 
reaction, the research will proceed in three stages: 1) identification 
of the most likely critical point of a market reaction, 2) tests of market 
reaction in terms of abnormal returns, and 3) tests of market reaction 
in terms of shifts in systematic risk. 
Variables and Data 
The various tests described in this section are based upon the market 
model developed by Sharpe [1963] and discussed earlier. The exact form 
of the model to be used is: 
1n(1 + RiJ = “i + si ln(1 + Rmt) + £it (2) 
which is, according to Fama [1970], consistent with the CAPM in continuous 
time. In the above model: 
R.^ is the return on security i in period t; 
Rmt is the return on the market index in period t; 
a. and e.j are parameters of the model; and 
e.. is the random disturbance term for period t, with an expected value 
of zero, constant variance and assumed to be non-autoregressive. 
The returns are wealth relative returns of the form: 
(^i,t+l ~ ^it) + ^it (3) 
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where: 
t h P-t is the price of the iLn security in period t; and 
t h is the amount of dividends on the iLn security in period t. 
Using the models discussed, the purpose in this section was to identify 
any stock market reaction to either accounting policy decision. The two 
techniques employed were residual analysis and the Chow test technique. 
These techniques help the researcher identify one or both of the following 
market reactions: 1) an abnormal price decline in a security or 2) a shift 
in the associated systematic risk of the securities. While a variety of 
competing hypotheses may be identified to explain these market reactions 
a discussion of these is deferred to the next Chapter. 
In order to identify the most likely critical date of a market reaction, 
given the number of possible dates associated with each pronouncement, 
an appropriate test was identified to estimate the point in time, if any, 
at which a discontinuous shift occurs in regression parameters of the market 
model. This is the Quandt [1958] maximum likelihood method and employs 
the following statistic: 
(VJl )%nl (Vj2)^n2 
nx n2 (10) 
A , [-] 
ni = In ^ ~ i 
' n ’ 
This log-likelihood ratio statistic was calculated, for each permissable 
point n^ over the range of 1970-1975 for ASR 147 and 1975-1980 for SFAS 
13. The analysis was done on portfolio data for the non-capitalizing 
sample only, since it is this group for which the market reaction is hypothesized, 
and was done separately for the ASR 147 and SFAS 13 periods. This procedure 
has been used by Simonds and Collins [1978] as a means of identifying the 
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most likely crtical data for a shift in systematic associated with the 
SEC1s required line-of-business disclosures. The value of for which 
An^ is minimized in each case represents the most likely critical data 
for a shift in systematic risk. 
Data Analysis Design 
Residual analysis. In order to detect any aggregate abnormal price 
effect or risk shift the four samples will be aggregated into portfolios. 
Each sample (ASR 147 experimental, ASR 147 control, SFAS 13 experimental, 
SFAS 13 control) will have the portfolio returns calculated as: 
wy= 1/n " ln(1 + Rit> (ii) 
1*1 
where: 
WRp^ e the wealth relative return in period j for portfolio p; 
±. L. 
R-jt = the return on the l n security (as defined earlier) in period j; 
n e the number of firms in each portfolio (sample); and 
p e the pth portfolio: 
ASR 147 experimental 
ASR 147 control 
SFAS 13 experimental 
SFAS 13 control. 
The regression using the market model will then be run to estimate the 
parameters on each portfolio: 
WR . = a + S_(WR .) + e <12) 
pt p pv mt' pt 
The estimation periods, using daily data, were: 
May 1972 - May 1973 for the ASR 147 tests; and 
June 1974 - July 1975 for the SFAS 13 associated tests. 
The residual analysis was done using parameters estimated from the models 
run on each portfolio for the estimation period.21 In addition, in light 
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of recent evidence presented by Elgers and Murray [1981] on the impact 
of the security market index chosen as proxy for the market portfolio 
the betas and residuals were analyzed using each of three market indices: 
1) the Standard and Poors (SP), 2) the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) Value-Weighted (VW), and 3) CRSP Equal-Weighted (EW) indices. 
A predicted return for each period was generated: 
WRpt = SP + 6p(WRmt) (13) 
A residual, or excess return, for each portfolio may then be calculated: 
£Pt = WV - WRPt (14) 
In this section of analysis, daily return data was used. Residuals were 
calculated and analyzed over a period of 20 trading days before and twenty 
trading days after the critical data or dates identified for each pronounce¬ 
ment. The analysis was done by calculating difference scores for the 
residuals of the matched samples: 
d(ASR147)t = epU - ^ (15) 
d(SFAS13)t = ep3t - ep4t (16) 
The method has been used in applied research using residual analysis 
by Collins and Dent [1979]. They note that calculating difference scores 
between portfolios of matched firms provides a means of partially con¬ 
trolling for other unspecified events that may have influenced the prices 
of the securities studied. The analysis employed the Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signedrank test which will be described more fully later. 
Beta stationarity analysis. Simonds and Collins [1978] have employed 
the Chow test methodology to assess whether systematic risk (beta) of 
a security has shifted. 
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The Chow test, first described by Chow [I960] is a statistical 
procedure specifically designed to test for statistically significant 
shifts in the beta coefficient in a linear time series regression. To 
compute the Chow statistics two separate time periods must be identified. 
For this study, the critical dates discussed earlier were used. Separate 
regressions were done on the data before the critical events and after 
the crticial events. Residuals from each regression were calculated. 
In addition, a regression was done on the pooled data. The residuals 
calculated from each regression are: 
A 
eil 








 (for the first time period) 07) 
ei2 
a 
= R. . 
i ,t2 - Ri,t2 
(for the second time period) (18) 
ei = R. . - l ,t Ri,t 
(for the pooled data). (19) 
Sums of squared residuals were obtained by transposing each residual 
vector and post-multiplying it by the untransposed residual vector. 
The following statistics were calculated: 
Q1 " V £i 
(20) 
A A A A 
Q2 = Ei1" eil + €i2 ei2 (21) 
Q3 = Ql - Q2 (22) 
Ql is distributed as a noncentral chi-square (with a noncentrality para- 
meter equal to a ) with T-K-l degrees of freedom, where T is the number 
of observations and K is the number of independent variables in the 
model. Q2 is a noncentral chi-square with (T^-K-l) + (T^-K-l) degrees 
of freedom (or T1 + T2 -2K - 2 d.f.) and Q3 is distributed as a noncentral 
chi-square with (T-K-l) - (T^ + T^ - 2K - 2) d.f. or (K T) d.f. (since 
T = T, + T«). The Chow test is: 
£ n / v j. l 
T1 + T2 ' 2K ' 2 = Q2/(T1 + T2 - 2K -2) (23) 
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The form of the regression done on the pooled data incorporated a dummy 
variable which allowed the intercept coefficient to vary between the sub¬ 
periods. As a result, the statistics generated were tests of the hypotheses 
that the slope coefficient, beta, changed during the test period. 
This analysis was done separately for each of the portfolios. This, 
as noted by Simonds and Collins [1978] enhances the power of the Chow test 
to detect statistically significant shifts in the beta coefficient of the 
market model, in comparison to similar analysis done on individual securities. 
Supplemental Sample of Firms. 
As noted earlier, it was felt that, in order to supplement 
the analysis and to facilitate comparison of the results and conclusions 
of this study with those of other studies of the mandatory lease capitalization 
issue, a supplemental sample of firms, composed of firms used in prior 
studies of the effects of SFAS 13, should be included. That supplemental 
sample of 60 firms, as listed in Table 29 in the Appendix, was included 
in the analyses done in this Chapter. 
Hypotheses 
It is important to note at this juncture that two variables are being 
studied in order to assess the market impact of the policy decisions: price 
reactions and shifts in systematic risk. Observations of these two variables 
are not necessarily independent. The residuals generated may be systematically 
biased if there has been a shift in systematic risk for either group of 
firms. As a result, although the hypotheses were tested separately it 
must be recognized that it may be impossible to disaggregate abnormal price 
effects and risk shifts if both have occurred. 
Bearing this in mind the following hypotheses were tested: 
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1) H : There was no difference between the ASR 147 leasing sample and 
control sample subsequent ASR 147 in terms of residuals or excess 
returns. 
H : The residuals of ASR 147 leasing sample firms were significantly 
lower than ASR 147 control sample firms subsequent to the ASR 
147 critical data. 
2) H : There was no difference between the SFAS 13 leasing sample and 
control sample subsequent to SFAS 13 in terms of residuals or 
excess returns. 
H^: The residuals of SFAS 13 leasing firms were significantly lower 
than SFAS 13 control sample firms subsequent to the SFAS 13 critical 
date. 
3) H : There was no significant difference in the systematic risk (6) 
of leasing sample firms before and after the release of ASR 147. 
H : The systematic risk of leasing sample firms did change significantly 
after the release of ASR 147. 
4) H : There was no significant difference in the systematic risk (e) 
of leasing sample firms before and after the release of SFAS 13. 
H : The systematic risk of leasing sample firms did change significantly 
after the release of SFAS 13. 
Results 
In order to assess the most likely critical date of a market reaction 
to either ASR 147 or to SFAS 13, given the number of possible critical 
dates associated with each pronouncement, the Quandt [1958] maximum likelihood 
method was used. This method can be useful in helping to identify the point 
in time at which there occurred a discontinuous shift in the regression 
parameters of the market model. The statistic employed by the Quandt maximum 
likelihood technique is: 
(^£_^i_)!sni (V_f£)Ssr'2 
Xn1 = ln[ nl n_Z 
/£.' e \^>n 




= the number of observations in the first sub-period 
^2 = the number of observations in the second sub-period 
n = the number of observations in the entire period of study 
A 
= the vector of calculated residuals from the regressions of the 
first subperiod 
A 
^2 = the vector of calculated residuals from the regressions of 
the second sub-period 
i = the vector of calculated residuals from regressions of the entire 
period of study. 
Regressions were run using the market model and returns of portfolios of 
the non-capitalizing firms in the experimental samples. Monthly data was 
used from 1969 to 1977 for the ASR 147 sample of firms and from 1972 to 
1979 for the SFAS 13 sample of firms. Residuals were calculated from each 
of two sub-periods for the Quandt log-likelihood statistic. The range of 
the sub-periods was varied from ending May 1973 to October 1973 for the 
ASR 147 sample and from ending July 1975 to August 1977 for the SFAS 13 
sample. The log-likelihood statistics were calculated using each of the 
three indices, S and P 500, CRSP Value Weighted and CRSP Equal Weighted. 
Tables 6 and 7 present the Quandt log-likelihood statistics for the ASR 
147 experimental sample and SFAS 13 experimental sample respectively, and 
Figures 1 and 2 present those statistics graphically. These statistics 
do not give a clear picture of the most likely critical point associated 
with a shift in systematic risk for the sample portfolios for either the 
ASR 147 time period or the SFAS 13 time period. For the SFAS 13 time period, 
however, there does appear to be a local minimum of the Quandt log-likelihood 
TABLE 6 
ASR 147 Experimental Sample -- Quandt Log-Likelihood Statistics 
Dates SP 500 CRSPVW CRSPEW 
May 1973 -2.592 -5.636 -3.607 
June 1973 * -3.080 -6.117 -4.039 
July 1973 -2.637 -5.683 -4.968 
August 1973 -2.437 -6.023 * -5.180 
September 1973 -2.480 *-6.302 -4.059 
October 1973 -2.363 -6.275 -3.733 
* local minimum 
TABLE 7 
SFAS 13 Experimental Sample -- Quandt Log-Likelihood Statistics 
Date SP 500 CRSPVW CRSPEW 
July 1975 -0.727 -4.993 -2.927 
August 1975 -0.518 -4.625 -2.986 
September 1975 -0.761 -4.410 *-3.464 
October 1975 -0.850 *-5.138 -3.244 
November 1975 -0.690 -4.700 -3.081 
December 1975 -0.822 -4.403 -2.951 
January 1976 -0.817 -3.576 -2.431 
February 1976 -0.753 -4.242 -2.148 
March 1976 -0.747 -4.220 -1.930 
April 1976 -0.846 -3.932 -1.695 
May 1976 -0.918 -3.883 -1.511 
June 1976 -0.925 -4.234 -1.783 
July 1976 -0.846 -3.854 -1.598 
August 1976 -1.046 -4.119 -1.538 
September 1976 -1.210 -4.138 -1.466 
October 1976 *-1.315 -3.984 -1.381 
November 1976 -1.283 -3.590 -1.365 
December 1976 -1.269 -3.172 -1.500 
January 1977 -0.561 -4.624 -1.556 
February 1977 -0.576 -4.238 -1.505 
March 1977 -0.634 -3.892 -1.379 
April 1977 -0.737 -3.621 -1.450 
May 1977 -0.872 -3.294 -1.365 
June 1977 -1.049 -3.295 -1.564 
July 1977 -0.839 -3.582 -1.897 
August 1977 -1.026 -3.270 -1.741 
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statistic centered around the September-October 1975 dates, which could 
be associated with the August 1975 release of the first exposure draft 
of SFAS 13. Because the sampling properties of the Quandt log-likelihood 
statistic, Xn.j, are not well specified, the alternative method of the Chow 
test, as describeed earlier, was used to test for shifts in systematic 
risk. Since the most likely critical dates were unclear from the Quandt 
log-likelihood analysis for either the ASR 147 period or the SFAS 13 period, 
several test periods were adopted for the Chow tests and for the analysis 
of residuals. 
Tests of Shifts in Systematic Risks 
The Chow tests were done using residuals from the market model, as 
described earlier. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the exact location 
of a possible shift point in the systematic risk of affected firms, the 
time period selected for the Chow test on ASR 147 firms excluded an eight 
month central period beginning in April 1973, two months prior to the announce¬ 
ment of the proposed ASR 147 (June 6, 1973) and ending in November 1973, 
two months after the adoption of ASR 147 (October 5, 1973). The non-over¬ 
lapping time periods used to test for a shift in systematic risk for the 
ASR 147 firms were January 1969 - March 1973 and December 1973 to December 
1977. Figure 3 illustrates the time intervals and critical dates involved 
for the ASR 147 Chow tests. 
The Chow tests on the SFAS 13 samples of firms were done using several 
time periods, because of the number of possible critical dates. The three 
test periods are presented in Table 8, and graphically in Figure 4. 
For each test period a five month central period was eliminated. 
72 
Table 8 
Test and Estimation Periods for SFAS 13 Chow Tests 




January 1972-June 1975 December 1975-December 1979 
January 1972-March 1976 September 1976-December 1979 
January 1972-July 1976 January 1977-December 1979 
Test Period 1 excluded the August 26, 1975 date when the first exposure 
draft of SFAS 13 was issued. The central period excluded for Test Period 
2, the July 22, 1976 date of the revised exposure draft, and for Test Period 
3, the November 30, 1976 date of release for SFAS 13 in finalvform. 
The specific operational hypotheses tested for each portfolio were: 
ASR 147 samples: 
Hq: Blp - B2p = 0 
H : Blp - B2p j< 0 
g 
where; Plp = the portfolio beta for the pre-test sup-period 
g 
P2p = the portfolio beta for the post-test sub-period 
p = portfolio (either non-capitalizing or capitalizing) 




6lp - S2p = 0 
Blp - 62p f 0 
where: 6 lp = the portfolio beta for the pre-test sub-period 
6, 2p = the portfolio beta for the post-test sub-period 
p = portfolio (non-capitalizing, capitalizing or supplemental 
non-capitalizing) 
For the SFAS 13 samples the hypotheses were tested for each of the three 
test periods identified and discussed earlier. The results of the tests 
of these hypotheses are summarized in Tables 9 and 10 for the ASR 147 samples 
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As indicated, the results suggest a significant decrease in the portfolio 
beta for the non-capitalizing firms in the ASR 147 sample where the Chow 
tests employed the CRSP Value-Weighted and CRSP Equal-Weighted indices, 
while no such significant decrease was found for the capitalizing firms 
in the ASR 147 sample. While the null hypothesis is rejected for the experi¬ 
mental firms, the direction of the shift in the portfolio beta is the opposite 
of what would have been hypothesized based upon the nature of the disclosure 
required by ASR 147. In particular, since ASR 147 required supplemental 
disclosure of information on the present value of non-capitalized leases, 
one might expect an increase in the systematic risk of firms not capitalizing 
their lease commitments if the disclosures contained information that was 
unavailable from alternative sources, such as financial analysts and if 
the disclosures indicated a relatively higher amount of "debt" in those 
firms capital structures. Although the direction of the shift in portfolio 
beta makes these results difficult to interpret, several explanations are 
possible. First, because of the relatively small size of the ASR 147 sample 
and because of the inability to fully control for intervening events that 
may confound the results, it is possible these shifts in portfolio beta 
may be coincidental but not related to the ASR 147 lease disclosure policy 
decision. Second, the significant negative shift in the portfolio beta 
may be related to actions taken by firms to alter their capital structures 
as a result of the required disclosures, although the results cited in 
Chapter IV do not support this hypothesis for the ASR 147 firms. Finally, 
it is possible that information from alternative sources such as financial 
analysts may have over-estimated the effect of leasing on the capital structures 
of the ASR 147 non-capitalizing firms. 
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The results of the hypothesis tests on the SFAS 13 samples of firms 
are more clear. The null hypothesis was not rejected for any of the samples 
over any of the three time periods studied for any of the indices used. 
These results indicate no significant shifts in the portfolio betas for 
the samples of firms affected by the SFAS 13 ruling. This evidence is con¬ 
sistent with the general hypothesis that the required disclosures under 
SFAS 13 contained no new information previously unavailable, and is consistent 
with the general conclusions of other studies of SFAS 13 issue (Abdel- 
Khalik et al. [1981], Finnerty, Fitzsimmons and Oliver [1980]). 
While analysis of the effects of these accounting standards, ASR 147 
and SFAS 13, at the portfolio level for affected firms is of interest, 
a related question of importance is the effects of the standards on individual 
firms. Chow tests were done on each individual firm in the ASR 147 samples 
and the results are summarized in Table 11. Similarly, Chow tests were 
done for the firms in the SFAS 13 samples and the results are summarized 
in Table 12. The hypotheses tested were analogous to those discussed earlier 
for portfolio betas, except that the dependent variables were the individual 
securities' betas. More detailed results are presented in Tables 31 and 
32 in the Appendix for the ASR 147 firms and Tables 33 - 41 in the 
Appendix. 
The results of the Chow tests on individual firms' beta coefficients 
give some indication of possible effects of ASR 147 and SFAS 13 on the 
systematic risk of firms affected by those changes. For the ASR 147 samples 
there were more statistically significant shifts in beta for the non¬ 
capitalizing group of firms than for the capitalizing group, and this result 
was consistent for all of the indices. Standard and Poor's (SP), CRSP 
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Value-Weighted (VW) and CRSP Equal-Weighted (EW), that were used.22 In 
addition, there were more significant changes within the non-capitalizing 
group for the VW and EW indices, which is consistent with the portfolio 
level results discussed earlier.23 
With the SFAS 13 set of samples, it may again be noted that the non¬ 
capitalizing sample had a larger number of significant shifts in systematic 
risk than the capitalizing sample. This finding is relatively consistent 
across the three time periods tested although the results appear more dramatic 
in the first time period, which defined January 1972 to June 1975 as the 
pre-event period and December 1975 to December 1979 as the post-event period 
and was centered around the first exposure draft of SFAS 13 as its critical 
event. In addition, the supplemental sample of non-capitalizing firms, 
added for purposes of comparison of these results with other studies showed 
a higher percentage of significant risk shifts than the capitalizing control 
sample. Both samples of non-capitalizing firms therefore had relatively 
higher numbers of firms with shifts in systematic risk than did the control 
sample of capitalizing firms, although analysis at the portfolio level 
did not indicate a significant shift in risk for either non-capitalizing 
portfolio sample.24 Several other observations regarding these results 
are of interest. It may be noted that the results obtained using the SP 
index do not indicate as much difference between the non-capitalizing 
samples, the experimental sample and the supplemental samples, and the 
capitalizing control sample than do the results obtained using either the 
VW or EW index.25 Finally, in comparing the results of the two non-capital¬ 
izing samples, it is interesting to note that while both samples have 
relatively higher percentages of significant risk shifts, the greater 
number are positive shifts for the original experimental sample, except 
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for tests using the SP index and the greater number were negative shifts 
for the supplemental sample, except for tests using the VW index. 
These findings are interesting and to some extent ambiguous, raising 
further empirical questions. Further discussion and interpretation of these 
findings and their empirical implications is deferred to the end of this 
chapter following the presentation of results from the analysis of residuals. 
Analysis of Residuals 
Analysis of residuals was performed in order to detect any aggregate 
abnormal price reaction to the critical events associated with ASR 147 
and SFAS 13 in protfolios of securities affected by those accounting stan¬ 
dards. This portion of the research was done using portfolio returns for 
the two groups of samples, the ASR 147 experimental and control samples 
and the SFAS 13 experimental and control samples.26 For each portfolio 
a regression using the market model was run to estimate the parameters. 
The form of the model as discussed in the previous section is: 
WRpt = “p + Bp(HRmt) + ept (12) 
where: 
a and 6 are parameters of the model 
P P 
e . is the random disturbance for time period t 
pt 
WR . is the wealth relative return at time t on portfolio p 
pt 
ASR 147 experimental 
ASR 147 control 
SFAS 13 experimental 
SFAS 13 control 
WR . is the wealth relative return at time t on the market index.27 
mt 
The critical dates of interest for this part of the study were: 
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ASR 147: 
1) June 6, 1973 (Announcement of proposal) 
2) October 5, 1973 (Adoption of proposal) 
SFAS 13: 
1) August 26, 1975 (First exposure draft) 
2) July 22, 1976 (Second exposure draft) 
3) December 2, 1976 (SFAS 13 announced).28 
The study was done using daily data and the estimation period associated 
with each event excluded at least a twenty trading day period prior to 
the critical date.29 For each critical date an estimation period of at 
least one year was used. A pre-event period of twenty days and a post¬ 
event period of twenty days were defined. Table 13 presents the estimation 
period, pre-event and post-event periods for each critical event. Tests 
were then done using two periods for each event, a forty day period including 
the pre-event and post-event periods and a twenty day post-event period. 
A predicted return for each portfolio was generated by: 
WR . = &•- + r (WR J pt p p v mt' (13) 
A residual was calculated for each time period t and each portfolio by: 
V = WRpt - WRpt (14) 
Thus, for each test period associated with a critical date the following 
difference scores were calculated:30 
dt,ASR 147 eAN,t ' gAC,t t " 1" 
where: AN e ASR 147 Non-capitalizing portfolio 
AC = ASR 147 Capitalizing portfolio 
and 
t = 1,...40 (15) 
where: 
dt,SFAS 13 SSN,t ‘ gSC,t t " 1" 
SN = SFAS 13 Non-capitalizing portfolio 
SC = SFAS 13 Capitalizing portfolio. 
t = 1....40 (16) 
83 
Table 13 
Critical Events, Estimation Periods and Test Periods 
ASR 147 
Estimation Pre-event Post-event 
Event Period Period Period 
Proposal Announced May 1, 1972- May 8- June 7- 
April 30, 1973 June 5, 1973 July 7, 1973 
Proposal Adopted May 1, 1972- September 7- October 6- 
April 30, 1973 October 4, 1973 November 1, 1973 
SFAS 13 
Estimation Pre-event Post-event 
Event Period Period Period 
1st Exposure Draft June 3, 1974- July 29- August 27- 
July 28, 1975 August 25, 1975 September 24, 1975 
2nd Exposure Draft June 3, 1974- June 23- July 23- 
May 30, 1976 July 21, 1976 August 19, 1976 
SFAS 13 Announced June 3, 1974- October 29- December 5- 
May 30, 1976 December 2, December 29, 1976 
1976 
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The differences scores, d^, were tested using the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-rank test. The purpose of this procedure is to test 
for a zero median of the differences between the two matched groups. Tests 
were done on the difference scores between the residuals because this 
procedure introduces a partial control for other events that may have affected 
the level of security returns for the firms included in these samples. 
In addition, the test does not assume that the difference scores, d^, are 
identically distributed in successive weeks nor does it assume that the 
residuals of the matched samples, the variables being compared, are un¬ 
correlated with one another. Because of the lack of restrictive assumptions, 
this represents a versatile and useful statistical tool for assessing a 
difference in the median level of risk-adjusted returns for the two groups. 
The propositions being tested are: 
1) For the ASR 147 matched samples, there is no difference in the 
median level of risk-adjusted returns for the two matched samples, 
non-capitalizing firms and capitalizings firms, surrounding either 
of the two ASR 147 critical dates, the release of the proposal 
or the acceptance of the proposal, and 
2) For the SFAS 13 matched samples, there is no difference in the 
median level of risk adjusted returns for the two matched samples, 
non-capitalizing and capitalizing firms, surrounding any of the 
three SFAS 13 critical dates, the first exposure draft, the second 
exposure draft or the announcement of SFAS 13. 
The test statistic for the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test 
is derived by ranking each difference score, d^, by its absolute value. 
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then reassigning a positive or negative sign to the ranks of the differences 
In developing hypotheses to be tested, consideration was given to the 
perceived negative effects on non-capitalizing firms of the two accounting 
standards, and null and alternative hypotheses based upon one-tailed tests 
were developed. 
For each set of samples, ASR 147 and SFAS 13, and for each critical 
event, using each of the three indices, SP, VW and EW: 
where: 
h • t > J" rN(N + 
Ha * N 2 L 2 J 
Tn e the summation of the negatively signed ranks 
N e the number of observations (difference scores); 20 for the 
post-event only period and 40 for the pre-event and post¬ 
event period 
kN(N + i)1 
2L 2 J e one half of the sum of all of the ranks, which is 
the expected value of if the ranks are equally 
and randomly divided between positive and negative 
differences; 
%[N(-N = 105 (N = 20) 
= 410 (N - 40) 
Table 14 presents a summary of the tests of the hypotheses.31 
As a final control procedure, the Ordinary Least Squares estimates 
of beta for the portfolios were replaced with an alternative estimator 
of beta as suggested by Dimson [1979] and by Roll [1981]. The estimator 
is a method of addressing the question of bias in beta estimates when shares 
are traded infrequently.32 Roll suggests this bias may be particularly 
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troublesome for beta estimates based upon daily data. The estimator developed 
by Dimson is developed from the inclusion of leading and lagging market 
indicators as variables in a multiple regression and summing the coefficients: 
n2 ^ 
6Dimson = 2 (24) 
k = -n^ 
where n^ is the number of lagged terms, and 
n^ is the number of leading terms included in the multiple 
regression. 
The results for the tests of the hypotheses using the Dimson estimator 
of beta are summarized in Table 43. Table 44 presents the OLS and Dimson 
estimators of beta for the various portfolios and estimation periods.33 
Using a .05 level of significance it was possible to reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the median level of risk adjusted returns 
between the ASR 147 experimental and control groups only for the announce¬ 
ment of the ASR 147 proposal on June 6, 1973, and this result held only 
for the residuals estimated using the CRSP EW index, and for the 40 day 
pre-event and post-event period, but not for the 20 day post event period. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis was not possible for the periods associated 
with adoption of ASR 147 on October 5, 1973. The Wilcoxon tests on residuals 
estimated using the Dimson method did not permit the rejection of the null 
hypothesis for either event using any of the indices or either the 40 day 
pre-event and post-event or the 20 day post-event period. 
Using the .05 level of significance, the null hypothesis of no difference 
in residuals between the SFAS 13 experimental and control samples could 
not be rejected for any of these critical events, the first exposure draft, 
the second exposure draft or the announcement of SFAS 13 in final form, 
using any of the three indices. The results using Dimson estimators of 
beta to generate residuals were essentially parallel to those obtained 
using OLS estimators. 
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Summary and Discussion of Results 
The results presented in this chapter do not give a strong indication 
of a market reaction at the aggregate level to either the SEC's ASR 147 
or the FASB's SFAS 13 on leasing. There was some indication of a statis¬ 
tically significant decrease in risk for the ASR 147 experimental group, 
but not for the control group. It is possible that this could be associated 
with changes in financing and leasing decisions of this group of firms, 
over a period of several years, since the change in risk for the portfolio 
is measured over several years. However, this is not consistent with the 
results presented in Chapter IV which found no significantly different 
changes in financing or leasing variables for this group of firms as compared 
to the control samples. Hence this result must be held as tentative in 
that it is possible that it could have resulted from other unspecified 
causes.34 No significant shifts in risk were found for the SFAS 13 samples 
used, at the aggregate level. This result is consistent with other studies 
in this area [Abdel-Khalik, et al. (1981) and Finnerty, Fitzsimmons and 
Oliver (1980)]. However, analysis, at the individual firm level, of signifi¬ 
cant risk shifts did seem to indicate less stability in risk for many of 
the firms most affected by the pronouncements ASR 147 and SFAS 13, although 
the direction of the shifts was not consistent. An analysis of the results 
at the individual firm level is of interest even without the finding of 
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a significant risk shift at the portfolio level. This issue and possible 
explanations of the significant shifts in risk are explored in the next 
chapter. 
The findings regarding abnormal price effects for the portfolios of 
firms affected by the pronouncements do not indicate any significant difference 
between the experimental and control samples for the critical events under 
study at the aggregate level. However, again the aggregate level analyses 
may have masked effects for individual firms and analysis of individual 
firms' price reactions can be further explored to see if reasons exist 
for a market reaction for certain individual firms and not for others. 
The aggregate level analyses of this chapter do not support the proposi¬ 
tion of a market reaction to the accounting standards under study, ASR 
147 and SFAS 13, at the portfolio level. However, the limited evidence 
of possible market reactions associated with individual firms merits further 
study. This research issue is pursued in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER VI 
TESTS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL MODELS OF CAPITAL MARKET REACTION 
TO SFAS 13 
The third research issue of importance to be considered in this 
study is the explanation of any observed abnormal market reaction. Although 
the evidence presented in the previous chapters gives little indication 
of a market reaction at the aggregate level, some evidence presented 
gave an indication of a market reaction for some of the firms in the 
experimental samples at the individual firm level of analysis. To explore 
this it will be useful to consider theories that might explain price 
declines or shifts in systematic risk associated with the accounting 
policy decisions. This will aid in the development of a model to explain 
why a capital market reaction was observed for some firms and not for 
others, as well as explain the differing magnitude of response across 
firms. The principal motivation for this research issue is to discuss 
possible explanations for capital market reaction which suggest variables 
to be included in an explanatory model for capital market reaction to 
lease accounting policy decisions. It is not the purpose of this research 
to distinguish among the several theories suggested. It should be noted 
that the theories suggested for the capital market reaction are neither 
mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive. 
Abdel-Khalik et al. [1981] discuss a theory that could lead to an 
explanation of a market reaction associated with SFAS 13. They theory 
is based upon the congruency between financial statement users' true state 
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of knowledge about the cosmetic nature of the SFAS 13 mandated disclosures 
and the affected firms' managers beliefs about the users' state of know¬ 
ledge. On this basis Abdel-Khalik et al. idenitfy two possible situations: 
1) financial statement users understand that SFAS 13 lease capital¬ 
ization is cosmetic in nature, and managers perceive that users' 
understand the cosmetic nature of lease capitalization; 
2) financial statement users understand that SFAS 13 lease capital¬ 
ization is cosmetic in nature, but managers perceive that users 
do not understand the cosmetic nature of lease capitalization. 
These states are based on the assumption of an informationally efficient 
captial market, which does not necessarily imply that managers of all, 
or any, of the firms affected understand, accept or are even aware of 
the implciations of marekt efficiency. The contention that managers are 
unaware or unaccepting of market efficiency is supported by Mayer-Sommer 
[1979]. 
The implications of the a priori reasoning presented by Abdel-Khalik 
et al. are that managers may be motivated to initiate actions to mollify 
the apparent effects of SFAS 13. The variables suggested as important 
by their reasoning were the relative size of the off-balance sheet lease 
prior to SFAS 13, and the size of the firm, since firm size would affect 
the flexibility of management to act. They also suggest that management 
actions themselves, such as those taken to reduce financial leverage 
or the amount of leasing done might be a factor affecting market reaction. 
Abdel-Khalik et al. also consider two other factors which might moti¬ 
vate managers to try to mollify the apparent effects of SFAS 13: the 
effects of lease capitalization on accounting measures used in debt covenants 
and bond indentures, and the effects of lease capitalization on the terms of 
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management incentive plans. Similar consideration is given to these issues 
by Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal [1980] in regard to another accounting 
issue. Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal discuss explanations of a capital 
market reaction to a mandatory change in accounting method, as prescribed 
by SPAS 19, in terms of four theories: a naive investor theory, a modified 
naive investor theory, a contracting cost theory based in agency theory 
[Jensen and Meckling, 1976] and an estimation risk theory [Klein and 
Bawa, 1976, 1977], It is the latter two which are supported by their 
results, and will be presented here. In considering the contracting cost 
theory, it is assumed that the wealth-maximizing firm is not indifferent 
in the choice among accounting methods because of financial contracts 
and arrangements and because a chosen accounting method has a particular 
set of costs and benefits which may include effects on capital costs, 
legal costs and costs of providing competition with excess information. 
Leftwich [1979] also notes, under an agency theory approach that mandatory 
changes in accounting principles restrict the choices which management 
has, and, therefore may reduce expected future cash flows because of 
increased bonding and monitoring costs and by a reduction in wealth trans¬ 
fers from bondholders to stockholders. What foil ins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal 
derive is that costs of potential violation of bond covenants lead to 
an abnormal price effect in those securities affected by the accounting 
change. 
The second theory discussed by Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal is based 
upon the estimation risk theory of Klein and Bawa [1976, 1977]. At its 
base is the idea that increases in estimation risk about the CAPM parameters 
can lead to an increase in the discount rate applied to cash flows and 
a resulting decline in firm value. The CAPM ignores uncertainty about the 
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means and variances of asset returns. It is argued that with a restriction 
in the choice of accounting methods investors become less certain about 
the investments available to the firm and about which investments may 
be selected by the firms and about firms' future cash flows because of 
changes in financing policy. From this theory Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal 
derived the proposition that firms having debt covenants or management 
compensation plans denominated in terms of accounting numbers are more 
t 
likely to have increased estimation risk and hence an abnormal price 
reaction. 
In the context of SFAS 13, since debt covenants and bond indentures 
are frequently restrictive in terms of financial measurements such as 
debt to equity ratios and these ratios often use accounting information 
as defined by generally accpeted accounting principles, firms could incur 
costs or penalites associated with violation of those restrictions including, 
possibly technical default as a result of lease capitalization under 
SFAS 13. In addition, management compensation from incentive plans, if 
based on an accounting rate of return could be adversely affected by 
lease capitalization under SFAS 13, possibly motivating managers to try 
to mollify the effects of SFAS 13. 
With respect to shifts in systematic risk the a priori reasoning 
presented by Abdel-Khalik et al. suggests that shifts in systematic risk 
may be associated with the size of the firm, the relative size of the 
affected firms noncapitalized leases prior to the SFAS 13 mandated capitali¬ 
zation, and managerial actions taken to mollify the effects of SFAS 13, 
such as action taken to reduce the amount of leasing done, and to reduce 
the amount of debt outstanding, such that apparent financial leverage 
ratios would not deteriorate as much as management may have feared. The 
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inclusion of these factors in explaining shifts in systematic risk is 
consistent with prior theoretical and empirical work by Bowman [1979] and 
Hamada [1972]. 
On the basis of the preceding discussion of theories, a priori reason¬ 
ing, and prior research considering capital market reactions to accounting 
policy decisions in general and the lease accounting issue in particular, 
several factors are suggested for inclusion in a cross-sectional model 
to explain observed market reaction in firms affected by SFAS 13.35 The 
factors will be discussed more fully in the next section. The factors 
included in the cross-sectional model of an abnormal price reaction are: 
1) firm size, 
2) the existence of debt or loan agreement covenants restricting 
further indebtedness or requiring the maintenance of certain 
ratios based on accounting numbers, 
3) the existence of a management bonus or incentive plan based in 
whole or part on an accounting-based performance measure, 
4) the amount of non-capitalized financial leases, prior to SFAS 13, 
5) debt to equity ratio. 
The reason for inclusion of the above factors is that, from prior research 
as well as theory and a priori reasoning these factors have been suggested 
as signals to market participants of possible management reaction to SFAS 13. 
The factors included in the cross-sectional model of shifts in systematic 
risk are the same as discussed above, with the addition of the following: 
1) changes in the amount of leasing undertaken, 
2) changes in financial leverage. 
These reflect, in part, the results of the possible managerial reaction 
to SFAS 13, as suggested by Abdel-Khalik, et al. [1981], and are suggested 
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by the a priori reasoning of Abdel-Khalik, et al. as important factors 
explaining market reaction, although they do not necessarily reflect 
the full range of possible managerial responses to mollify the apparent 
effects of SFAS 13. 
Sample Firms, Variables and Methodology 
Sample Firms 
The cross-sectional regression models used in the analysis included 
the SFAS 13 experimental sample of firms and the supplemental sample 
of firms discussed earlier. These firms all had a substantial amount 
of noncapitalized leases prior to the initial exposure draft of SFAS 
13 in August 1975. The SFAS 13 experimental sample consisted of 46 firms 
initially and the supplemental sample consisted of 60 firm initially, 
totalling 106 firms. As discussed earlier, because daily return data 
was unavailable for eight of the experimental firms and for four of 
the supplemental firms, these companies were deleted for the cross-sec¬ 
tional regression model using abnormal returns as its dependent variable.36 
No firms were deleted for the model employing shifts in systematic risk 
as a dependent variable. 
Dependent Variables 
The two dependent variables discussed earlier to represent market 
reaction to the accounting policy decisions were abnormal price reaction 
and change in systematic risk. Operationally, the following definitions 
were used: 
1) CARj = the cumulative abnormal (risk-adjusted) return for each 
individual firm for the thirty trading day period beginning 10 
days before and ending 20 days after the date of the first exposure 
draft of SFAS 13, August 26, 1975. 
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T 
CAR. = Z g t = 1...30 
J t = -| 
(25) 
j = 94 
The residuals, were derived from the market model using daily 
data, discussed earlier (Equation 2, page 20) as follows: 
(26) 
2) ABj = the change in the estimated beta coefficient measuring 
systematic risk for an individual firm from the 42 month period 
ending June 1975, to the 49 month period after November 1975. 
This is Test Period 1 as discussed in Table 8 (page 72).37 
Independent Variables 
The definitions and measurement of the independent variables were 
as follows: 
1) Firm Size (x.j), 
x-j = Total assets of firm j in the year prior to the exposure 
draft (1974). 
2) Debt or loan agreement or covenant (x^), stated in terms of 
accounting numbers which would have been affected by lease 
capitalization and which existed prior to 1 975,38 
x^ = 1, if a debt covenant existed or 
0, if no debt covenant existed. 
3) Management Incentive or bonus plan (x^), based upon performance 
measures which could be affected by lease capitalization and 
which existed piror to 1975.39 
x^ = 1, if a bonus or incentive plan existed, or 
0, If no such plan existed. 
4) The present value of non-capitalized financial leases for firm 
J in the year prior to the SFAS 13 exposure draft (x^),40 
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Xq = Present Value of non-capitalized leases in the year prior to 
the exposure draft (1974). 
5) Debt to Equity Ratio of firm j in the year prior to the 
exposure draft (1974), 
_ Book Value of Debt & Preferred Stock 
x5 - 
Market Value of Common Equity 
6) Change in the debt to equity ratio (x^) of firm j from the year 
prior to the exposure draft (1974) to the year subsequent to 
the exposure draft (1975), 
x6 - 
Book Value of Debt & Preferred Stock 
Market Value of Common Equity +1 
'Book Value of Debt & Preferred Stock 
Market Value of Common Equity 0 
7) Percentage change in the amount of leasing (tfy) for firm j from 
the year prior to the exposure draft (1974) to the year subsequent 
(1975), 
(PV financing leases)+-j - (PV financing leases)Q 
x7 - 
(PV Financing Leases)^ 
Methodology 
The methods tested were in the form of cross-sectional regression 
models: 
CARj «Q + 6i^ij + «2x2j + 53x3j + 64x4j + 55x5j + u 
A®j = 60 +6lxlj + S2x2j + 63x3j + 54x4j + S5x5j 
+ S-rX-,1 + v 
(27) 
+ S6*6j + V?j 
The coefficients 5^ were estimated using OLS regression 
(28) 
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Hypotheses and Discussion of Variables 
For the CARj model (Equation 27) the following hypotheses are presented 
1) For the* total assets ) variable, discussion by Abdel-Khalik, 
et al. [1981] posits that larger firms have greater flexibility 
in their choices of actions taken in response to the mandatory 
accounting change, increasing the likelihood of actions taken 
in response to the change. Other authors [Ferrara, Thies and 
Dirsmith, 1979] have suggested that the management of larger 
firms perceive themselves as being less affected by lease capi¬ 
talization than small firms. As a result of this ambiguity the 
hypotheses presented in non-directional: 
H0 : 6,-0 
Ha : + 0 
2) For the categorical variable indicating debt covenants (a^), 
discussion by Abdel-Khalik, et al. and by Collins, Rozeff and 
Dhaliwal [1979] indicated that the existence of these agreements 
and the possible technical violation of these agreements because 
of lease capitalization would tend to increase the likelihood 
of management action in response to SFAS 13. Therefore, a negative 
relationship was hypothesized: 
H : 6, = 0 
0 1 
Ha : «2 < 0 
3) For the categorical variable indicating the existence of a manage¬ 
ment compensation plan based upon performance measured by account¬ 
ing number (x^)t discussion by Abdel-Khalik et al. posits that 
this factor could increase the likelihood of management response 
to SFAS 13. Hence a negative relationship is hypothesized. 
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H0 : 53 " 0 
H 63 < 0 
4) The present value of non-capitalized leases (2^) in the year 
prior to the exposure draft is suggested by Abdel-Khalik et 
al. as increasing the likelihood of managerial response to SFAS 
13 for firms with relatively high non-capitalized leases. As 
a result a negative relationship is hypothesized. 
H0 : 64 = 0 
H 64 < 0 
5) The debt to equity ratio (xin the year prior to the exposure 
draft, although not explicitly considered elsewhere is posited 
here as increasing the likelihood of managerial action in response 
to SFAS 13 for firms with relatively high debt to equity ratios 
prior to lease capitalization. A negative relationship is hypo¬ 
thesized. 
H0 : °5 = 0 
H 55 < 0 
For the model to explain shifts in the estimated beta coefficient. Equation 
28, the hypotheses were as follows: 
1) For total assets (x^), as noted earlier Abdel-Khalik et al. 
suggest that the management of larger firms have more flexibility 
to act in response to lease capitalization. Since actions taken 
to mollify the apparent effects of lease capitalization would 
be to reduce debt outstanding the hypothesized relationship 
is negative in this case. 
H. <5, = 0 
Ha " 41 * 0 
TOO 
2) For the categorical variable representing debt covenants (x^), 
the a priori reasoning and evidence presented by other authors, 
as noted earlier, indicates a greater likelihood of management 
action to mollify the effects of lease capitalization; therefore, 
a negative relationship is hypothesized. 
3) For the categorical variable representing the existence of manage¬ 
ment incentive on bonus plans (x^), the previously noted discussion 
by Abdel-Khalik et al. and others indicates an increased likeli¬ 
hood of management action to mollify the effects of lease capital¬ 
ization; therefore, a negative relationship is hypothesized. 
H0 ; 63 0 
H. 63 < 0 
4) The present value of non-capitalized leases (xin the year 
prior to the exposure draft is suggested by Abdel-Khalik et 
al., as noted before, as a factor increasing the likelihood 
of management action to mollify the effects of lease capitaliza¬ 
tion. A negative relationship therefore is hypothesized. 
5) The debt to equity ratio (xf.) is used as a proxy to measure 
the firms financial leverage. Evidence presented by several 
authors [Hamada, 1972; Bowman, 1979] suggests a positive relation¬ 
ship between financial leverage and systematic risk. Information 
reflected in the debt to equity ratio could reflect prior 
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changes in financial leverage which are not necessarily related 
to the issue of lease capitalization. The debt to equity ratio 
could also indicate a greater likelihood of management action 
in response to lease capitalization. The hypotheses in this 
case is presented as non-directional. 
6) Changes in financial leverage (:r6) represent in part a measurement 
of a change in a financing decision of the firm. As noted earlier, 
much theoretical and empirical work [Bowman, 1979, 1980; Hamada, 
1972] suggests that financial leverage and systematic risk are 
positively related. The relationship is therefore hypothesized 
to be positive. 
H0 : 66 0 
H • > 0 a o 
7) The percentage change in the amount of leasing (xj) represents 
in part a measure of financing decisions or changes in financing 
decisions. Since empirical work by Bowman [1980] has suggested 
that non-capitalized lease information is impounded in measures 
of systematic risk, the relationship of changes in leasing to 
changes in measured systematic risk is hypothesized to be positive. 
H • 6, > 0 
a / 
This section has presented a series of hypotheses about the relation¬ 
ships of the various independent variables and the two dependent variables 
in the cross-sectional models, as well as a discussion of the a priori 
reasoning and previous research that suggested those hypotheses. The 





The results of the OLS regression model for the CAR. variable, described 
J 
in Equation 27, to explain any abnormal market reaction to the first 
exposure draft are presented in Table 15. As before, in order to assess 
the sensitivity of the results to the choice of market index, CARs were 
estimated for each firm using the market model and each of three indices 
to proxy for the market portfolio, the Standard and Poor's 500 (SP) Index, 
the CRSP Value-Weighted (VW) Index and the CRSP Equal-Weighted (EW) Index. 
The results presented in Table 15 do not permit the rejection of the 
null hypothesis for the regressions as a group: 
H 0. 
That is, the regressors as a group do not differ significantly from zero 
in the cross-sectional explanatory model for the OLS estimated CARs. 
2 
The adjusted R further indicates the low explanatory power of the model, 
less than .03 in the regression. The results were essentially parallel 
regardless of the choice of market index used in the OLS estimation of 
CARs in this model. Examination of the individual parameter estimates 
indicates that, although the sign of the estimated parameter was in the 
hypothesized direction for all of the estimated parameters, they were 
not significantly different from zero, with the exception of the constant 
term and the coefficient of the debt to equity ratio. The following null 
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The null hypotheses concerning debt to equity ratio could be rejected 
in favor of the alternative: 
H : 6C < 0. a o 
Table 16 presents results from similar tests using CARs obtained using 
the Dimson method discussed in Chapter V (Equation 24). The results pre¬ 
sented in Table 16 are similar to the results obtained with the OLS estima¬ 
tion of the CARs, with the identical rejections or acceptances of the 
null hypotheses. Tables 17 and 18 present similar tests for the period 
surrounding the second exposure draft of SFAS 13 issued in July 1976.41 
The results presented for the CAR model in this second test period indicate 
2 2 
even lower R and corrected R statistics and, as before, none of the 
tests of the hypothesis that the regressors, as a group, have explanatory 
power were significant. In addition, none of the individual coefficients 
tested individually were significant with the sole exception of the co¬ 
efficient of non-capitalized leases using the VW index and the Dimson 
estimation method for the CARs. 
The inferences that can be made from the results presented in this 
section are generally consistent with those presented in other studies 
of SFAS 13 on leases. The results of the Abdel-Khalik et al. study found, 
in general, no significantly lower abnormal returns for companies affected 
by the SFAS 13 lease accounting standard, even with consideration of 
firm size, the amount of non-capitalized leases and managerial actions 
as partitioning variables in their samples. The results presented here 
lead to similar conclusions, employing a different methodological approach. 
Furthermore, the results present herein were obtained using different 
indices as proxies for the market portfolio in estimating the CARs as 
well as the Dimson estimation technique for the CARs in addition to the 
OLS estimation procedure. The results proved insensitive, in this case. 
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to the different choice of estimation method for the CARs.42 
In explaining the results, a conclusion that could be suggested 
is that the market did efficiently impound information related to non¬ 
capitalized leases prior to SFAS 13 and in aggregate did not perceive 
leasing companies as being adversely affected by SFAS 13, nor did the 
market anticipate managerial actions adversely affecting these companies. 
Confounding this conclusion is the fact that accounting policy decisions 
most often do not occur instantaneously, but rather take shape over a 
period as long as several years. In the context of other accounting policy 
decisions, in particular SFAS 33, a multiple events perspective has been 
suggested [Sepe, 1982], Although methodology in this area is quite new, 
this represents a possible avenue of further research. 
AB- Model 
vJ 
The results of the cross-sectional OLS regression for the A§. model, 
vJ 
described in Equation 28 to explain shifts in estimated beta coefficients 
of firms affected by SFAS 13 in the period surrounding the first exposure 
draft are presented in Table 19. In contrast to the CAR model for which 
no tests had been performed on the CARs for individual firms, Chow tests 
were performed for the individual firms to test for significant shifts 
in the beta coefficient. The results of those tests, presented in Table 
12 of Chapter V and discussed therein, were consistent with an hypothesis 
of market reaction to SFAS 13 in terms of shifts in systematic risk for 
some individual firms affected by SFAS 13. 
The results presented in Table 19 indicate that at the .05 level 
of significance, the null hypothesis that the regressors as a group have 
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Ha : V *2 * V 65 ^ °* 
2 2 
The R and adjusted R statistics vary depending on the choice of market 
index but are higher than .10 in all cases. The F statistics for the 
models using the VW index and EW index are statistically significant 
2 
at .01 and the adjusted R statistics are higher with the ABs measured 
using these indices as well. 
Addressing the individual independent variables, the null hypothesis 
concerning the coefficients of total assets, the categorical variable 
representing debt covenants, the categorical variable representing manage 
ment incentive plans and the measured change in lease commitments could 
not be rejected at the .05 level of significance. The following null 

















For the coefficient on non-capitalized leases, the sign was in the hypo¬ 
thesized direction and the coefficients were all significant at the .05 
level. With the models using AB measured by the VW and EW index, the 
coefficients were significant at .01. The null hypothesis was rejected 
for the coefficient on non-capitalized leases in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis: 
Regarding the coefficient on the change in the debt to equity ratio, 
the t tests were all significant at the .01 level, and the sign was in 
the hypothesized direction. The null hypothesis in this case was therefore 
rejected in favor of the alternative:43 
Hq : 66 » 0 
Ill 
The results regarding the debt to equity ratio are more ambiguous. When 
a 
AB was measured using the EW index, the t test was significant at the 
.05 level, however, with AB measured using the SP and VW index, the coeffi¬ 
cients were not significant. Because of this discrepancy, the null hypothesis 
could not be conclusively rejected: 
The results in general, were relatively consistent, with the excep¬ 
tion of the coefficient on the debt to equity ratio, regardless of the 
choice of market index. As a further check on the impact of the measurement 
of the dependent variable, the signed F statistics from the Chow tests 
for shifts in beta were substituted for the ABs. Signed F statistics 
were computed simply by multiplying the sign of the change in beta, either 
positive or negative, by the F statistic which is by definition a positive 
number. The results of tests of these models are presented in Table 20. 
As with the model employing AB the models using the signed F statistic 
of the Chow test yielded statistically significant results at the .05 
level, although the and adjusted R^ were slightly lower when the dependent 
variable was derived from Chow tests using the VW and EW index. With 
the dependent variable derived from Chow test using the SP index, the 
regression was significant at .01 and the R and adjusted R improved. 
The null hypotheses on the coefficients of total assets, debt covenants, 
incentive plans and the change in lease commitments could not be rejected 
as before and the null hypotheses were rejected on the coefficients of 
non-capitalized leases and the change in debt to equity ratio as before. 
Similarly ambiguous results were present regarding the coefficient of 
a 
the debt to equity ratio in the signed F statistic models as in the AB 
112 
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models. Generally, the results did not differ dramatically between the 
signed F models and the A§ models and the same inferences and conclusions 
could be drawn. In this case the results, inferences and conclusions 
do not appear to be sensitive to either the choice of market index employed 
or the measurement of the dependent variable.44 
The cross-sectional models discussed above used dependent variables 
measured using the first exposure draft of SFAS 13 as the critical event. 
Since it is unclear which critical date is most appropriate for study 
in this context and others involving accounting policy decisions, the 
models and tests discussed above were repeated with variables measured 
surrounding the second exposure draft of SFAS 13 in July 1976.45 Tables 
21 and 22 present the results of the cross sectional regression models 
using A8 and signed F statistics for Test Period 2 (second Exposure Draft) 
as dependent variables. As before, the dependent variables were measured 
using the three indices discussed earlier, SP, VW and EW. The results 
are again consistent between the dependent variable used, A§ or the signed 
F statistics, and among the three indices. The results are, however, 
considerably different from the Test Period 1 results. None of the F 
statistics in these models indicates a statistically signficiant relation¬ 
ship between the dependent variable and the regressors as a group. Further- 
p 9 
more, the R statistics and especially the adjusted R statistics are 
considerably lower. The only coefficients for which the null hypothesis 
may be rejected are the constant term and the coefficient on the debt 
to equity ratio. The implications of these results are of interest in 
conjunction with the results from the Test Period 1 models. 
Discussion of the A0. Model Results 
J 
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of the a priori reasoning and theory discussed by Abdel-Khalik et al. 
[1981], The models presented indicated statistically significant results 
in explaining the cross sectional variation among firms in terms of shifts 
in measured systematic risk in Test Period 1. The variables which were 
most significant in explaining the cross sectional differences among 
firms were the amount of non-capitali zed leases prior to the first expo¬ 
sure draft of SFAS 13, and changes in the debt to equity ratio of the 
firms. 
Abdel-Khalik et al. found that firms taking actions subsequent to 
the adoption of SFAS 13 which would reduce the debt to equity ratios 
had larger declines in systematic risk than those firms not taking such 
actions. Although their findings were consistent with the posited hypothesis 
that firms affected by SFAS 13 would take such actions and that such 
actions would lead to reductions in systematic risk for action firms, 
their results were found to be inconclusive largely because changes in 
financing decisions could not be unequivocably attributed to SFAS 13. 
(p. 154). The results presented here are largely consistent with the 
findings of Abdel-Khalik et al. and furthermore, consistent with their 
a priori reasoning regarding the extent to which firms having relatively 
large amounts of non-capitalized leases would be affected. The significant 
negative coefficient of the noncapitalized lease variable indicates that 
firms within the sample used in this research had a negative relationship 
between the amount of leases prior to 1975 and shifts in systematic risk. 
The significant positive coefficient on the change in debt to equity 
ratio further supports the a priori reasoning that firms affected by 
SFAS 13 took action to mollify the effects of the lease capitalization, 
and that such actions led to relatively larger declines in systematic 
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risk. Unfortunately, however, as with the research presented by Abdel-Khalik 
et al., financing decisions which change the debt to equity ratio cannot 
necessarily be attributed to SFAS 13. Findings of a positive relationship 
between changes in the debt to equity ratios firms and changes in system¬ 
atic risk are not surprising considering the findings of prior research 
[Hamada, 1972; Bowman, 1979, 1980] that would indicate such a relationship. 
The joint finding of a significant negative relationship between the 
amount of non-capitalized leases, prior to the first exposure draft of 
SFAS, and shifts in systematic risk, and a positive relationship between 
changes in the debt to equity ratio and shifts in systematic risk does 
add strength to the proposition presented by Abdel-Khalik et al. that 
actions to reduce the debt to equity ratio were induced by SFAS 13. 
The finding that the coefficients of the categorical variables repre¬ 
senting debt covenants that might be adversely affected as a result of 
lease capitalization were not significant is not necessarily surprising. 
For many of the covenants reported in the various annual reports and 
10-K it was unclear whether or not non-capitalized leases were considered 
to be debt under the restrictive covenants. Abdel-Khalik et al. note 
that the concern expressed regarding possible technical violation of 
covenants may have been overmphasized because the long implementation 
period for SFAS 13 would allow firms to renegotiate contracts to avoid 
such technical violation. 
In discussing the results of the cross sectional models for Test 
Period 2, consideration should be given to the dependent variable used. 
Fewer statistically significant shifts in beta were found for that time 
period, possibly confounding the results. In addition, the finding of 
the debt to equity ratio as having a significant relationship to changes 
in the measured systematic risk could be explained by the fact that the 
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previous year's changes in debt to equity ratio are now included in the 
measured debt to equity ratios for the Test Period 2 models. These are 
offered as possible explanations of the results found in conjunction 
with the test period, not as posited or proven hypotheses. 
In summary, the results presented in this chapter, while not conclu¬ 
sive, are consistent with previous research on the effects of SFAS 13. 
The results are consistent with a proposition that firms in which manage¬ 
ment may have perceived the firm to be adversely affected by SFAS 13 
may have taken actions to reduce the apparent effects of lease capitali¬ 
zation, and are further consistent with a proposition that such actions 
led to market reaction in terms of shifts in systematic risk. This evi¬ 
dence should be taken as further consideration of results of previous 
studies, and as evidence in support of hypotheses of prior research on 
which the results were inconclusive. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY, REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The results presented in this study represent an extension of prior 
research in the area of the economic impact of accounting policy decisions 
in general and SFAS 13 in particular. Evidence was presented in Chapter 
IV indicating that firms affected by SFAS 13 exhibited changes in financial 
and accounting variables significantly different from the control group 
of firms, suggesting that firms affected by SFAS 13 may have initiated 
changes in financing or leasing policy in order to mollify the apparent 
effects of SFAS 13. This was not a particularly surprising finding in 
light of the strongly expressed negative sentiments reported in the finan¬ 
cial press regarding SFAS 13. There was no evidence, based on the results 
of this study of a similar reaction to ASR 147. 
While the results presented in Chapter V do not give convincing 
evidence of a negative capital market reaction to SFAS 13 in terms of 
residual analysis, some evidence of a larger number of statistically 
significant shifts in risk was found for the group of firms affected 
by SFAS 13 at the individual firm level of analysis. This result did 
not hold at the aggregate portfolio level, but the findings at the indi¬ 
vidual firm level is of interest in itself. For the firms studied which 
were affected by ASR 147, only limited evidence of a market reaction 
to ASR 147 in terms of residual analysis was found, but there was some 
indication of a significant decline in systematic risk for those firms 
at the portfolio level „ This was further supported by the larger number 
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of firms having statistically significant shifts in systematic risk at 
the indivdiual firm level for the ASR 147 experimental sample. No evidence 
was found for either the ASR 147 control group or the SFAS 13 control 
group of a particularly large number of risk shifts at the individual 
firm level, nor was there any evidence of a statistically significant 
shift in systmeatic risk for either group at the portfolio level. 
The results presented in Chapter VI do not give any indication that 
the propositions and models proposed as explanation of the cumulative 
abnormal residuals for firms affected by SFAS 13 have any strong explana¬ 
tory power. The propositions and models discussed as explanation of shifts 
in systematic risk did present evidence of explanatory power for risk 
shifts surrounding the first exposure draft of SFAS 13. The results of 
hypothesis tests indicated further support for some of the propositions 
and a priori reasoning of the Abdel-Khalik et al. study. The results 
of this study add further confirmation to the empirical work of Abdel-Khalik 
et al. and bring additional evidence to bear on issues that were ambiguous 
from the results of that study. Specifically, shifts in systematic risk 
were found to be related in a positive direction to changes in the debt 
to equity ratio and negatively related to the amount of non-capitalized 
leases prior to SFAS 13. 
Limitations and Perspective 
The purposes of this study were to consider what effect, if any, 
new standards for lease accounting have had on management policy, to 
consider the capital market effect of the lease accounting standards 
and to consider explanations of these economic effects. Foster [1980] 
has underscored the idea that, while testing for the existence of an 
association between a particular accounting policy decision and a capital 
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market reaction is important, the more interesting research question 
is in testing explanations for such associations. This research has attempted 
to consider such explanations for a capital market reaction to accounting 
policy decisions on leasing. While careful partitioning of a sample can 
provide insight on such explanations, testing of a broader, cross-sectional 
explanatory model can provide further insight in considering explanations 
of the economic effects of accounting policy mandating changes in accounting 
methods. 
As with any research, limitations must be recognized. In studies 
of accounting policy decisions, "event" time coincides with "real" time. 
As noted by Foster, the possibility of confounding events must be recognized, 
even when care has been exercised in order to allay this problem. This 
is potentially most severe, however, with accounting policies such as 
SFAS 19 which affect only one or two industries. As a result, the hypo¬ 
thesized causal link between an accounting policy decisions and economic 
event which occur concurrently with or subsequent to the accounting policy 
decisions, can not be proven unequivocally. Evidence presented can be 
taken only as supportive or not supportive of such causal hypotheses. 
Another general concern is the choice of particular methodologies 
to study the research questions. Numerous choices, such as the form of 
the market model used, the choice of market index as proxy for the market 
portfolio, and the technique to be used in the estimation of systematic 
risk. The issues have been considered in a variety of contexts by other 
authors [Beaver, 1981; Foster, 1980; Brown and Warner, 1980; Elgers, 
1980; Elgers and Murray, 1982] but the important question in this context 
is whether these choices lead to different inferences from the results 
derived. While care can be exercised in such choices, and different alter- 
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natives explored to assess the sensitivity of the results to these alter¬ 
natives, somewhat arbitrary choices often need to be made. In this research 
several alternatives were explored with regard to the estimation of system¬ 
atic risk and with regard to the choice of market index used. While certain 
methodologies are asserted as superior on a priori grounds, this is not 
true with every choice made, and stronger or more significant results 
cannot be used in justifying the superiority of one method over another 
without such a priori support. 
Yet another general concern is one which is endemic to much economic 
and accounting research. Many economic and financial variables are not 
directly measurable, and surrogate measures must be used. Valavanis [1959] 
as quoted in Kennedy [1980] has described the problem somewhat whimsically, 
yet with great insight: 
Econometric theory is like an exquisitely balanced French 
recipe.... But when the statistical cook turns to raw 
materials, he finds that hearts of cactus fruits are un¬ 
available, so he substitutes chunks of cantaloupe; where 
the recipe calls for vermicelli he uses shredded wheat; 
and he substitutes green garment dye for curry, ping-pong 
balls for turtle's eggs, and, for Chalifougnac vintage 
1883, a can of turpentine, (p. 83) 
The point made is that the results of research employing econometric 
methods is only as good as the ingredients, the measured variables. While 
there is little that can be done in many cases to ameliorate the problem, 
it is necessary to acknowledge the problem of measurement error for many 
economic and accounting variables. 
Significance and Implications 
In recent years economic consequences of accounting policy decisions 
and standard setting have become a growing area of interest among a variety 
of constituencies. The standard setting process is becoming more political 
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and parties outside of the accounting profession, including the govern¬ 
ment and corporate management, have become more active. The growing debate 
with regard to economic consequences is no longer as much a question 
of whether such consequences exist but what impact such consequences 
should have on the standard setting process. Understanding the reasons 
for such economic consequences may add some insight to that question. 
An important point to be made with regard to research on accounting policy 
decisions, changes, and various types of accounting information comes 
from Gonedes and Dopuch [1974], The current research methods used in 
accounting research of this type are unable to determine the desirability 
in a social or economic sense of changes in accounting standards or new 
disclosure requirements. Such judgements have been and remain subjective. 
Clearly, the FASB, currently the primary accounting policy making 
body, is feeling increasing pressure to consider the economic consequences 
of its actions. This pressure has come from both government sources and 
private sector sources. [Zeff, 1978; Solomons, 1978], Some academicians, 
as well, have made this suggestion. Collins, Rozeff, and Dhaliwal [1980] 
suggest that: 
...accounting policy makers who are considering the 
elimination or alteration of exisitng accounting alter¬ 
natives should recognize that accounting choice decisions 
and investment/financing decisions of the firm are inter¬ 
dependent, and that changes in the former may affect the 
latter, thereby creating wealth losses or wealth transfers 
among the firm's capital suppliers, (p. 64) 
The implication of their statement is that accounting policy makers con¬ 
sider, at least subjectively, the social and economic costs and benefits 
of a particular accounting policy decision. Perhaps they should, but 
debate has centered on the extent to which the FASB's decisions should 
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be influenced by economic consequences. Zeff [1978] in particular has 
argued: 
To say that any significant economic consequences 
should be studied by the board does not imply that 
accounting principles and fair presentation should 
be dismissed as the principal guiding factor in the 
board's determination, (p. 63) 
Arguments by Zeff and by Solomons [1978] to this effect are persuasive. 
The FASB and other accounting policy making bodies must balance their 
perspective between the economic effects of their decisions, and the 
accounting principles guiding those decisions. 
Finally, an implication that has been largely ignored in the debate 
on economic consequences is the understanding of economic consequences by 
users of accounting information and by corporate management. Much of 
the research on SFAS 13 has focused on the posited economic consequences 
associated with management action in response to a mandated, but apparently 
cosmetic change in disclosure. Better understanding of the nature and 
source of possible economic consequences might be useful to both users 
and generators of accounting information. 
ENDNOTES 
Zeff [1978] and Solomons [1978] provide more thorough and thought 
provoking discussions of the issue surrounding economic consequences 
and the politicization of accounting. 
In a March 1979 meeting of the FASB, various aspects of lease 
accounting were discussed. At that time a majority of Board members 
indicated that if lease accounting were to be reconsidered, the FASB, 
as presently constituted, would be inclined to support a property 
rights approach in which all non-cancelable leases would be capital¬ 
ized and presented in the financial statements of lessees. 
[Alexander, 1981] 
An extended discussion of the broader definition of a substantive 
change may be found in Foster [1980]. 
Zeff [1978] states that it is clear that various external sources, 
such as the United States Congress and certain governmental agencies, 
do expect policy making bodies like the FASB to explicitly consider 
the economic consequences of their actions. 
ASR 147 was announced publicly in June 1973 and adopted in October 
to be effective November 30, 1973. For SFAS 13, an exposure draft 
was released in August 1975, revised and rereleased in July 1976 




Only one experimental firm and one subsequently matched firm was 
included in both groups of samples. 
As noted by Abdel-Khalik et al., any materiality criterion defined 
is necessarily arbitrary. This criterion is a more conservative 
definition of the materiality of noncapitalized leases than others 
used in the literature such as the one employed by Finnerty, 
Fitzsimmons and Oliver [1980]. 
The industry classification code assigned by Compustat conform 
closely to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes used 
by the Bureau of Budget of the U.S. Government. 
The Vasicek adjustment procedure was first suggested by Vasicek 
[1973] and has been employed by Elgers [1980] and Elgers and Murray 
[1982] in prior empirical research. The adjustment is: 
2 _ B ./Var( 6.) + 87Var(p') 
Py ~ ^_1__ 
l/Var(B.) + 1/Var(S') 
where Bv = Vasicek-adjusted beta 
B1 = the cross-sectional mean of betas estimated 
by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
Var(B') = the variance of the cross- 
sectional distribution of OLS betas 
8. = the individual firm's beta as estimated by OLS 
Var(B-) = the squared standard error of the individual 
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firm's OLS beta. 
The cross-section of firms used in this part of the study initially 
included 96 potential experimental and match firms for the ASR 147 
samples, and 206 potential experimental and match firms for the SFAS 
13 time period. 
Monthly returns were used to estimate the OLS betas. For the ASR 147 
sample, 59 monthly returns from February 1969 to December 1973 were 
used, and for the SFAS 13 sample, 59 monthly from February 1971 to 
December 1975. For 2 firms in the ASR 147 group of 96 firms and 21 
firms in the SFAS 13 group of 206 firms, data was missing for part 
of the five year period. For those firms, regressions were run using 
only the data available; for no firms however, was the estimation 
period less than 34 months. 
10 Another issue of measurement arises because a choice needs to be 
made of which available market index to use as a proxy for the "true" 
market portfolio. The CRSP Equal-Weighted Index was chosen arbitrarily 
because, to implement the matching process, one market index had to 
be selected. Elgers and Murray [1981] note that an appropriate 
market index cannot be identified on an a priori basis, but did 
find empirically that estimates of beta generated using the CRSP 
Equal-Weighted Index were more highly correlated over successive 
time periods than estimates using other indices. 
11 Since there may be fairly high col linearity among some of the match 
variables, it should be noted that each variable is weighted implicitly 
by the variance-covariance structure of the variables within the cross¬ 
section. 
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12 Tables 23 - 26 in the Appendix present selected financial data for 
the ASR 147 experimental group, the SFAS 13 experimental group, the 
ASR 147 control group and the SFAS 13 control group respectively. 
Tables 27 and 28' list the industries represented in the ASR 147 
samples and SFAS 13 samples. 
13 These variables are measured, as before, in 1973 for ASR 147 samples 
and 1975 for the SFAS 13 samples. 
14 Table 29 in the Appendix presents selected financial data for the 
SFAS 13 supplemental sample and Table 30_ lists the industries 
included in that sample. 
15 Book value of debt was used for the reasons discussed earlier, in 
conjunction with Bowman's [1980] findings. Additionally, it should 
be noted that the book value of debt included the pro forma amounts 
of present values of non-capitalized lease comnvitments for the firms 
having such commitments, so that capitalization under SFAS 13 would 
not in itself affect the measures. 
16 This measure includes capitalized and non-capitalized financing leases. 
17 Tests were replicated in all cases using a market value measure for 
common equity in the debt ratio, and the results using that measure 
were substantially the same in all test periods. 
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18 For the 1975-1979 test period, five of the forty-six matched pairs 
had to be dropped because data was unavailable for one or both of 
the matched firms. 
19 Although SFAS 13 is dated November 1976 by the FASB, the actual press 
release was not until December 2, 1976. 
20 ASR 225, released by the SEC required retroactive compliance with 
SFAS 13 for firms filing with the SEC beginning with statements issued 
for fiscal years ending after December 24, 1978. 
21 In addition to analysis on residuals from OLS regressions, a supplemental 
procedure was employed using residuals from regression parameters 
adjusted in consideration of the potential bias in these estimates 
of parameters introduced by trading infrequency. The problem has been 
discussed by Roll [1981] and by Dimson [1979]. The adjustment procedure 
used was the one suggested by Dimson [1979]. The Dimson estimator 
calculates a multiple regression of the portfolio or security return 
on contemporaneous, leading and lagged values of the market indices 
and then sums the slope coefficients to obtain an adjusted estimate 
of beta. 
It is difficult to make any statistical inferences about the difference 
in the number of significant changes between the two samples. Hence 
no such claim is made. 
In considering these results it should be borne in mind that the power 
of the Chow test to detect significant shifts in regression parameters 
is much lower with individual securities than with portfolios because 
of the greater magnitude of the error term in the regression using 
individual security returns. 
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24 See Footnote 22 above. 
•> 
25 Table 42 in the Appendix presents the Table 12 Summary in a slightly 
different format in order to facilitate the comparison of results 
across indices. 
26 Because the analysis in this section depends upon matched samples, 
no analysis could be done using the supplemental sample 
of SFAS 13 non-capitalizing firms. 
As before, for completeness and in order to determine if the choice 
of market index had any impact upon the inferences from the results 
three indices were employed: Standard and Poors (SP), CRSP Value- 
Weighted (VW) and CRSP Equal-Weighted (EW). 
These critical dates were selected because abnormal price reaction 
is most likely to be associated with the announcement of a proposal 
or the adoption of a proposed accounting standard rather than effective 
dates of the pronouncements. Other studies of similar issues have 
centered on this type of event [Collins and Dent (1979), Abdel-Khalik 
et al. (1981)]. 
Many researchers have eschewed the use of daily data in research of 
this type [Collins and Dent (1979), Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal (1980), 
Abdel-Khalik et al. (1981)], because of the possible bias and estimation 
problems associated with the market model at that level, and have 
used weekly data instead. Recent evidence cited by Dimson [1979] and 
Roll [1980] suggests that when a firm's shares are subject to infrequent 
trading these problems may be present for weekly data as well, although 
not as severely as for daily data. Dimson [1979] has suggested a 
procedure for addressing this problem, and this was employed as a 
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supplementary approach in the analysis of this section. This procedure 
is discussed further subsequently. 
For the ASR 147 samples one firm had to be deleted from each sample 
because daily return data was unavailable for the firms on the CRSP 
data base. Hexcel Corporation was deleted from the non-capitalizing 
sample and Sta-Rite Industries was deleted from the capitalizing sample. 
With the SFAS 13 samples, four companies were eliminated from 
the capitalizing sample and eight from the non-capitalizing sample 
because of the unvailability of daily price data. The firms deleted 
were Decorator Industries, National Mine Service, DWG Corporation 
and Chilton Corporation from the capitalizing sample, and Billy the 
Kid, Hoffman Industries, Puritan Fashions, Analog Devices, Arrow 
Automotive, Intermark, Mattel and Cenco from the non-capitalizing 
sample. 
31 Tests of two-tailed hypotheses were done as well and the results were 
essentially parallel to those presented in Table 14. 
32 See Dimson [1979] for a discussion of this bias in beta estimates. 
The Dimson estimators of beta used here employed 10 lagged and 5 leading 
terms in the regression. Roll [1981] employed 21 lags and 5 leads 
and found that, for many periods up to ten lagged terms were often 
significant, but that further lags were seldom significant. The 
evidence Roll presents is limited, but in the absence of other evidence 
and in the interest of avoiding "data mining," the arbitrary decision 
was made to include 10 lags and 5 leads. 
34 A further point of tangential interest is that the result was obtained 
when tests were done on the residuals from the market model, using 
the CRSP VW and CRSP EW indices. A researcher employing only the Standard 
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and Poor's index would not have found such a result at all. 
A similar model could have been explored for firms affected by ASR 
147 as well, but this was precluded by the much smaller size of the 
ASR 147 sample and the lack of certain data prior to 1972. 
36 Reference was made in Footnote 30 above to the eight firms deleted 
from the SFAS 13 non-capitalizing sample. The four firms deleted from 
the SFAS 13 supplemental non-capitalizing sample were International 
Multifoods, Heublein, Alexander's and Caldor. 
37 As is typical with most econometric studies, many variables are not 
inherently measurable directly; therefore, these represent proxy variables. 
The disturbance terms in the cross-sectional models will represent, 
in part, that measurement error. As a further control the F statistic 
indicating the significance of the systematic risk shift will be 
employed in order to see if the results differ. 
38 This information was gathered from annual reports and 10-K filings 
with the SEC. The exact restrictions of the covenant or agreement 
were not always unambiguous from the disclosure made. A conservative 
approach was used in that only those firms for which specific reference 
was made to restrictions based on GAAP generated financial data or 
ratios were coded as having such loan or debt covenants. 
Interestingly, several loan agreements (Delta Airlines, Republic 
Corporation, Barton's Candy and Dillard) specifically included limits 
on further indebtedness or leasing that could be undertaken, or formally 
included leases in the measurement of debt prior to SFAS 13. One 
agreement specifically excluded leases but stated that debt was 









This information was gathered from annual reports and from proxy 
statements filed with the SEC. As with debt covenants, a conservative 
approach was followed in that only those firms which disclosed specific 
reference to an accounting based performance measure that would be 
affected by SFAS 13 were coded as having such a plan. 
The non-capitalized lease commitments used represented disclosures 
in 1974 or 1975 per the requirements of ASR 147. 
The measurement of the dependent variables was for the year before 
the second exposure draft, 1975 rather than the year before the first 
exposure draft, 1974, for these models. 
This insensitivity to various assumptions and choices in research 
methodology should not be held as generalizable beyond the current 
research. 
In addition to employing a change in debt to equity ratio for one 
year, an identical model employing a two year change was run. The 
results were substantially the same as for the one year change. 
It should be noted again that this insensitivity to choices in market 
index and independent variable measurement should not be held as 
generalizable beyond the present study. 
The measurements of independent as well as dependent variables were 
changed to reflect the 1976 critical date; therefore, financial variables 
used 1975 rather than 1974 data. 
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2010 Kane Miller 155.3 .126 .715 1.56 
2200 Fieldcrest Mills 198.2 .060 .667 .89 
2300 Hart, Schaffner & Marx 301.0 .055 .580 1.11 
2300 Lilli Ann Corp. 9.9 .052 .460 1.68 
2300 Noel Inds. 15.7 .074 .762 1.53 
2549 Hexcel Corp. 27.4 .065 .515 1.88 
2800 Allied Chemical 1762.5 .065 .389 .84 
3000 Cooper Tire & Rubber 88.8 .378 .783 .97 
3000 Uniroyal 1581.2 .057 .836 1.10 
3210 Seagrave 54.1 .060 .799 1.68 
3241 Kaiser Cement 205.2 .053 .713 .87 
3270 National Gypsum 451.7 .053 .433 1.03 
3310 Crane Co. 587.3 .077 .844 .95 
3310 La Barge, Inc. 27.5 .052 .657 .86 
3310 Unarco 66.9 .110 .739 1.19 
3350 Belden 82.1 .109 .586 .45 
3560 Milton Roy 28.0 .074 .294 1.20 
3630 Scovi1 361.0 .069 .707 1.29 
3662 Raytheon 705.8 .050 .430 1.26 
3714 Teleflex 18.2 .080 . 605 1.69 
3811 Whitehal1 16.0 .054 .693 1.22 
9997 Katy Inds. 180.7 .058 .823 1.34 
9997 LTV Inds. 1829.1 .076 .949 1.96 
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TABLE 24 




Total Leases to 
Assets Total Beta 
(MM $) Assets Leverage Coefficient 
2000 Consolidated Foods 
2010 Rath Packing 
2046 Staley Mfg. 
2200 West Point Pepper1 
2300 Billy the Kid 
2300 Damon Creations 
2300 Manhattan Inds. 
2300 Noel Inds. 
2300 Phillips Van Heusen 
2300 Piedmont Inds. 
2300 Puritan Fashions 
2450 Golden West Homes 
2649 APL Corp. 
2761 Duplex Products 
2820 Pantasote Inc. 
2844 Helene Curtis 
2911 Ashland Oil 
3000 Armstrong Rubber 
3079 Cellucraft 
3079 Robintech 
3310 Hofmann Inds. 
3410 National Can 
3449 Brooks and Perkins 
3449 Republic 
3540 Esterline 
3560 Scott and Fetzer 
3610 Gould 
3662 Moog 
3679 Analog Devices 
3679 International Rectifier 
3714 Arrow Automotive 
3714 Intermark 
3714 Whitaker Cable 
3940 Mattel 
4210 Banner Inds. 
4210 Spector 
5063 Action Inds. 
5065 Sterling Electronics 
5199 SMD Inds. 
5912 Gray Drug 
5912 Payless Drug Stores 
5944 Jewel cor 
5980 Suburban Propane 
7370 Bolt, Beranek, Newman 
8050 Cenco 































































































ASR 147 CONTROL GROUP — 1973 SELECTED RATIOS 
Industry 
Code Firm 
2010 Iowa Beef Processors 
2200 Spings Mills 
2300 Garan Inc. 
2300 Interco Inc. 
2300 Jonathan Logan 
2649 Papercraft Corp. 
2800 Rohm and Haas 
3000 Dayco Corp. 
3000 Firestone 
3210 Guardian Inds. 
3241 Ideal Basic Inds. 
3270 Gifford Hill & Co. 
3310 Bliss and Laughlin Inds. 
3310 Lukens Steel 
3310 National Steel 
3350 Revere Copper and Brass 
3560 StaRite Inds. 
3630 Reece Corp. 
3662 King Radio 
3714 Kysor Industrial 
3811 United Industrial 
9997 Alaska Interstate 
9997 Litton Inds. 
Total 
Assets 
(MM S) Leverage 
Beta 
Coeffic 
152.9 .658 .91 
442.1 .662 .47 
32.7 .423 1.33 
546.9 .435 1.14 
262.9 .576 1.50 
79.8 .571 1.15 
816.0 .276 .88 
255.5 .822 .99 
2669.0 .631 .86 
85.9 .396 1.72 
270.5 .295 .94 
171.3 .623 .99 
114.5 .602 .86 
148.9 .394 1.46 
2024.4 .532 .80 
485.7 .887 1.16 
56.5 .697 1.05 
42.3 .106 .97 
24.2 .281 1.59 
72.6 .647 1.50 
46.7 .838 1.54 
168.2 .586 1.26 
2116.2 .858 1.55 
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TABLE 26 
SFAS 13 CONTROL GROUP — 1975 SELECTED RATIOS 
Industry 
Code Firm 
2000 Quaker Oats 
2010 Valmac Inds. 
2046 American Maize Prods. 
2200 Riegel Textile 
2300 Decorator Inds. 
2300 House of Ronnie 
2300 Jonathan Logan 
2300 Movie Star Inc. 
2300 Palm Beach Inc. 
2300 Sal ant Corp. 
2300 Superior Surgical Mfg. 
2450 Kit Mfg. 
2649 Dennison Mfg. 
2761 Ennis Business Forms 
2820 Reichold Chemicals 
2844 Faberge Inc. 
2911 Cities Service Co. 
3000 Mohawk Rubber 
3079 Mongram Inds. 
3079 Voplex Corp. 
3310 Allegheny Ludlum Inds. 
3410 Van Dorn Co. 
3449 Nucor Corp. 
3449 Philips Inds. 
3540 Acme - Cleveland 
3560 National Mine Service 
3610 UV Inds. 
3662 Barnes Engineering 
3679 Electro Audio Dynamics 
3679 Veeco Instruments 
3714 Federal-Mogul Corp. 
3714 Howell Inds. 
3714 Kysor Industrial 
3940 Medalist Inds. 
4210 Golden Cycle Corp. 
4210 Telecom Corp. 
5063 Clark Consolidated Inds. 
5065 Arrow Electronics 
5199 Universal Leaf Tobacco 
5912 Cunningham Drug Stores 
5912 Revco Drug Stores 
5944 Medco Jewelry Corp. 
5980 DWG Corp. 
7370 Chilton Corp. 
8050 Beverly Enterprises 
8060 Humana Inc. 
Total 
Assets 
(MM $) Leveraqe 
Beta 
Coeffi 
765.1 .437 .82 
106.4 .800 1.20 
118.2 .418 .90 
147.8 .559 .81 
7.4 .580 1.21 
20.7 .566 1.39 
252.7 .579 1.67 
20.8 .704 .81 
70.4 .735 1.35 
94.2 .748 1.23 
27.9 .760 1.15 
12.1 .777 1.80 
156.5 .573 .98 
29.3 .426 .93 
237.1 .576 .84 
166.7 .654 1.16 
3233.5 .606 .40 
91.1 .763 .96 
151.5 .770 1.45 
10.3 .517 1.44 
638.3 .719 .85 
69.3 .691 1.31 
92.6 .611 1.02 
89.0 .796 1.45 
178.1 .742 .89 
53.9 .317 1.24 
446.7 .756 1.04 
6.8 .746 1.54 
47.5 .890 1.29 
29.8 .631 1.44 
274.1 .691 .70 
9.3 .425 .72 
71.8 .784 1.27 
55.8 .781 1.18 
53.9 .695 .98 
59.1 .884 1.23 
8.1 .700 1.25 
44.9 .866 1.26 
237.2 .605 .62 
41.2 .685 1.22 
195.7 .295 1.02 
27.0 .895 1.65 
143.8 .935 1.37 
16.5 .664 1.56 
71.1 .888 1.44 
310.9 .805 1.40 
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TABLE 27 
INDUSTRIES REPRESENTED IN ASR 147 SAMPLES 



















Textile Mill Products 
Apparel and Other Finished Products 
Converted Paper and Paperboard Products 
Chemicals and Allied Products 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 
Flat Glass 
Cement Hydraulic 
Concrete, Gypsum and Plaster 
Blast Furnaces and Steel Works 
Rolling and Drawing Nonferrous Metal 
General Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
Household Appliances 
Radio and Television Transmitting Equipment 
Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories 
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Food and Kindred Products 
Meat Products 
Wet Corn Milling 
Textile Mill Products 
Apparel and Other Finished Products 
Wood Buildings/ Mobile Homes 
Converted Paper and Paperboard Products 
Manifold Business Forms 
Plastic Materials and Synthetics 
Perfumes, Cosmetics and Toilet Preparations 
Petroleum Refining 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 
Miscellaneous Plastic Products 
Blast Furnaces and Steel Works 
Metal Cans and Shipping Containers 
Miscellaneous Metal Works 
Metal Working Machinery and Equipment 
General Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
Electronic Trnamission and Distribution Equipment 
Radio and Television Transmitting Equipment 
Electronic Components 
Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories 
Toys and Amusements, Sporting Goods 
Trucking - Local and Long Distance 
Wholesale Electronic Apparatus and Equipment 
Wholesale Electronic Parts and Equipment 
Wholesale Nondurable Goods 
Retail — Drugs and Proprietary Stores 
Retail — Jewelry Stores 
Retail — Fuel and Ice Dealers 
Services — Computer and Data Processing 
Services — Nursing and Personal Care 
Services — Hospitals 
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TABLE 29 
SFAS 13 SUPPLEMENTAL SAMPLE -- SELECTED 1975 FINANCIAL DATA 
Industry 
Code Firm 
2000 Beatrice Foods 
2041 International Multifoods 
2065 Bartons Candy 
2086 Heublein 
2099 CHB Foods 
2911 Atlantic Richfield 
3140 Stride Rite 
3452 Huck Mfg. 
3651 Craig Corp. 
3728 Macrodyne 
3730 Conroy 
4511 Delta Airlines 
5140 Scot Lad Foods 
5311 Alexanders 
5311 Allied Stores 
5311 Ames Dept. Stores 
5311 Associated Dry Goods 
5311 Carter Hawley Hale 
5311 Crowley Milner 
5311 Dayton-Hudson 
5311 Dillard 
5311 Federated Dept. Stores 
5311 Jamesway Corp. 
5311 Marshall Field 
5311 Mercantile Stores 
5311 Outlet Co. 
5311 Sears Roebuck 
5311 Vornado 
5311 Wieboldt Stores 
5311 Zayre Corp. 
5331 Caldor's Inc. 
5331 Kings Dept. Stores 
5331 Rapid American 
5331 Wal-Mart Stores 
5411 Albertsons 
5411 Alterman 
5411 Circle K 
5411 Dillon Cos. 
5411 Fairmont Foods 
5411 Great A & P 
5411 Laneco 
5411 Lucky Stores 
5411 Niagra Frontier Systems 











1844.4 166.3 .090 
300.3 12.0 .040 
10.2 3.8 .373 
742.9 64.7 .087 
55.1 4.0 .073 
7364.8 486.7 .066 
48.9 6.4 .131 
35.5 3.2 .090 
33.4 2.5 .075 
19.4 5.0 .258 
33.8 1.5 .044 
1353.7 216.6 .160 
124.6 56.8 .456 
163.1 31.7 .194 
1100.3 215.3 .196 
37.3 38.3 1.027 
757.0 234.0 .309 
794.0 275.7 .347 
24.6 11.5 .467 
944.9 36.3 .038 
124.3 39.0 .313 
1839.9 170.7 .093 
38.2 31.2 .940 
356.4 29.9 .084 
329.8 40.1 .122 
86.0 23.6 .274 
11576.6 357.0 .031 
381.7 50.2 .132 
87.0 15.5 .178 
334.1 144.8 .433 
82.7 52.8 .638 
83.2 73.6 .885 
1479.5 273.6 .185 
100.2 41.3 .412 
221.9 142.1 .640 
59.3 11.9 .201 
67.4 53.1 .788 
175.2 59.4 .339 
154.8 25.3 .163 
989.3 94.7 .096 
24.4 1.5 .061 
590.2 269.5 .456 
43.6 24.8 .569 
40.0 11.8 .295 
284.7 23.0 .081 
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5411 Ruddick 73.5 13.6 .185 
5411 Safeway Stores 1574.7 985.3 .626 
5411 Supermarkets General 309.6 159.3 .515 
5411 Thriftimart 59.4 15.7 .264 
5411 Winn-Dixie Stores 445.5 33.8 .076 
5600 Belscot Retailers 15.2 9.1 .599 
5600 Masters 28.3 17.5 .618 
5621 Lane Bryant 131.8 8.3 .063 
5712 Levitz Furniture 142.7 140.3 .983 
5712 RB Inds. 18.7 20.5 1.096 
5812 Carrols Development 27.1 33.2 1.225 
5812 Church's Fried Chicken 65.4 13.1 .200 
5812 Collins Foods International 48.8 48.1 .986 
5812 Denny's 140.4 114.7 .817 
5812 Marriott Corp. 737.1 91.9 .124 
TABLE 30 
INDUSTRIES REPRESENTED IN SUPPLEMENTAL SAMPLE OF 
FIRMS AFFECTED BY SFAS 13 




















Food and Kindred Products 
Flour and Other Grain Mill Products 
Candy and Other Confectionary 
Distilled, Rectified and Blended Beverages 
Food Preparations 
Petroleum Refining 
Footwear Except Rubber 
Bolts, Nuts, Screws, Rivets, Washers 
Radio and TV Receiving Sets 
Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment 
Ship and Boat Building and Repairing 
Air Transportatioin — Certified 
Retail — Department Stores 
Retail — Variety Stores 
Retail — Grocery Stores 
Retail — Apparel and Accessory Stores 
Retail — Women's Ready to Wear 
Retail — Furniture Stores 
Retail — Eating Places 
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Table 31 
Chow Test Statistics and Beta Changes -- 
ASR 147 Non-Capitalizing Firms 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 
Kane Miller -.67 1.54 -1.35 7.94*' 1.90 6.37* 
Fieldcrest Mills -.12 .07 1.24 .31 + .07 .05 
Hart, Schaffner & 
Marx + .34 .70 -.02 .00 -.07 .05 
Lilli Ann Corp. -.63 1.34 -1.11 4.55* -.54 2.34 
Noel Inds. -.15 .04 + .04 .00 + .01 .00 
Hexcel Corp. +1.25 5.83* 1.15 5.66* + .78 5.12* 
Allied Chemical + .01 .00 -.08 .06 -.14 .31 
Cooper Tire & 
Rubber +1.40 7.94* + .67 1.81 + .83 6.54* 
Uni royal + .04 .01 -.29 .81 .01 .00 
Seagrave -1.04 3.36 -1.20 5.17* -.52 2.27 
Kaiser Cement + .22 .29 -.04 .01 + .13 .25 
National Gypsum + .49 1.59 -.86 6.26* -.41 2.78 
Crane Co. -.56 2.36 -.63 3.17 -.38 2.37 
LaBarge, Inc. + .18 .10 + .00 .00 + .10 .06 
Unarco -.44 .95 -.57 1.82 -.51 2.96 
Belden + .07 .04 -.07 .06 + .03 .02 
Milton Roy + .31 .34 -.11 .05 -.01 .00 
Scovil -.09 .05 -.47 1.52 -.09 .12 
Raytheon -.54 1.93 -.55 2.40 -.70 6.92* 
Teleflex -.07 .01 -.24 .20 -.15 .15 
Whitehall -.02 .00 -.48 .67 -.53 1.69 
Katy Inds. + .04 .01 -.57 1.14 -.21 .31 
LTV Inds. -1.44 4.90* -1.35 4.28* -.81 2.95 
* Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table 32' 
Chow Test Statistics and Beta Changes — 
ASR 147 Capitalizing Firms 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 
Iowa Beef 
Processers -.27 .31 + .01 .00 + .10 .08 
Springs Mills + .16 .26 + .21 .40 + .14 .86 
Garan Inc. + .80 2.05 -.10 .04 + .05 .02 
Interco Inc. + .55 3.57 + .14 .19 + .16 .49 
Jonathan Logan +1.13 4.67* + .62 1.41 + .79 4.12* 
Papercraft Corp. + .58 1.48 + .21 .21 + .36 1.38 
Rohm and Haas + .38 .93 + .43 1.59 + .34 1.62 
Dayco Corp. + .28 .63 -.53 2.30 -.16 .41 
Firestone + .22 .57 + .05 .03 + .19 .84 
Guardian Inds. + .38 .38 + .42 .47 + .57 1.74 
Ideal Basic Inds. + .05 .03 + .04 .14 -.14 .36 
Gifford Hill & 
Co. + .19 .20 + .08 .04 -.18 .46 
B1 iss and 
Laugh!in Inds. + .09 .08 -.30 .90 -.11 .31 
Lukens Steel -.71 2.13 -.84 3.47 -.75 5.04* 
National Steel -.24 .76 -.62 5.59* -.31 2.59 
Revere Copper 
and Brass -.19 .07 -.40 .36 -.14 .09 
StaRite Inds. + .90 4.03* + .57 1.67 + .25 .61 
Reece Corp. + .06 .03 -.20 .25 + .08 .09 
King Radio + .80 .46 -.06 .01 + .05 .01 
Kysor Industrial -.82 2.22 -1.13 4.75* -.44 1.72 
United Industrial -.17 .12 -.91 3.41 -.65 3.29 
Alaska Interstate .20 .10 -.48 .63 -.44 .83 
Litton Inds. -.02 .00 -1.21 3.53 -.39 .81 
* Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table 33 
Chow Test Statistics and Beta Changes 
SFAS 13 Non-Capitalizing Firms - Period 1 
SP INDEX 
Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic 
Consolidated 
Foods -1.02 11.12* 
Rath Packing + .28 .13 
Staley Mfg. -.49 1.20 
West Point 
Pepperel -.53 2.27 
Billy the Kid -.24 .07 
Damon Creations -.99 3.03 
Manhattan Inds. -.34 .44 
Noel Inds. -.27 .13 
Phillips Van 
Heusen -.83 1.95 
Piedmont Inds. + .78 .71 
Puritan Fashions + .26 .09 
Golden West Homes -.45 .33 
APL Corp. -.91 2.57 
Duplex Products + .22 .13 
Pantasote Inc. + .45 .52 
Helene Curtis + .12 .02 
Ashland Oil -.01 .00 
Armstrong Rubber -.03 .00 
Cellucraft -.59 .35 
Robintech -.51 .34 
Hoffman Inds. + .52 .61 
National Can + .43 1.18 
Brooks & Perkins + .70 1.20 
Republic -.33 .17 
Esterline + .48 1.06 
Scott & Fetzer -.38 .98 
Gould -.38 1.00 
Moog + .63 1.32 
Analog Devices + .32 .29 
International 
Rectifier -.21 .09 
Arrow Automotive +1.30 2.43 
Intermark + .92 1.68 
Whitaker Cable -.41 .66 
Mattel + .76 .60 
Banner Inds. + .35- .21 
Spector + .35 .21 
Action Inds. + .06 .00 
VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Change Statistic Change Statistic 
-.99 14.19* -.64 13.93* 
+ .41 .26 + .22 .26 
-.47 1.41 -.38 1.77 
+ .41 1.58 -.24 1.00 
-.28 ..12 -.32 .32 
-.36 .46 -.36 1.04 
.16 .13 + .15 .28 
+ .34 .27 + .41 .80 
+ .01 .00 -.02 .00 
+1.45 3.17 +1.31 5.59* 
+1.27 2.57 + .70 1.95 
+ .24 .11 -.21 .18 
-.41 .66 -.40 1.32 
+ .42 .59 + .47 1.33 
+ .60 1.21 + .39 1.03 
+ .48 .52 + .18 .17 
+ .32 1.16 + .19 .78 
+ .45 .90 + .05 .02 
+ .50 .32 + .37 .38 
+ .31 .18 + .31 .36 
+ .91 2.45 + .82 4.15* 
+ .64 3.67 + .37 2.55 
+ .66 1.35 + .44 1.32 
+1.12 2.17 + .51 1.35 
+ .77 3.92 + .50 4.49* 
-.27 .66 -.09 .14 
-.18 .28 -.25 1.14 
+1.08 5.35* + .93 8.93* 
+ .11 .30 + .32 .71 
-.01 .00 -.00 .00 
+1.71 6.01* +1.22 5.63* 
-1.02 2.53 + .46 .96 
+ .24 .26 + .02 .00 
+ .82 .69 + .25 .16 
+1.30 3.51 + .61 1.69 
+ .42 .35 + .26 .30 










Electronic + .39 .18 
SMD Inds. + .84 1.59 
Gray Drug -.20 .15 
Payless Drug 
Stores -.31 .50 
Jewel cor -.09 .01 
Suburban Propane -.29 .33 
Bolt Beranek & 
Newman -.05 .01 
Cenco + .24 .06 
Huntingdon 
Health + .17 .07 
(Continued) 
VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Change Statistic Change Statistic 
+ .36 .18 + .10 .03 
+1.60 7.45* +1.18 8.35* 
+ .19 .16 + .15 .21 
+ .01 .00 -.10 .16 
+ .10 .02 -.23 .26 
-.13 .09 -.16 .25 
+ .25 .17 + .04 .01 
+ .65 .57 + .50 .67 
+ .24 .17 + .51 1.70 
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Table 34 
Chow Test Statistics and Beta Changes -- 
SFAS 13 Non-Capitalizing Firms - Period 2 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 
Consolidated 
Foods -.73 5.04* -.73 6.75* -.50 5.30* 
Rath Packing + .56 .60 + .95 2.04 + .48 1.07 
Staley Mfg. + .12 .06 + .14 .11 + .07 .06 
West Point 
Pepperel -.34 .83 -.20 .36 -.07 .08 
Billy the Kid -.60 .37 -.30 .11 -.57 .87 
Damon Creations 1.42 4.96* -.44 .51 -.50 1.43 
Manhattan Inds. -1.04 3.46 -.47 .81 -.23 .42 
Noel Inds. -.56 .51 + .11 .03 -.04 .01 
Phil!is Van 
Heusen -.96 2.39 -.07 .02 + .01 .00 
Piedmont Inds. -.03 .00 +1.06 1.39 + .70 1.24 
Puritan Fashions -.07 .01 +1.24 2.38 + .71 1.85 
Golden West Homes -1.18 2.09 -.18 .05 -.46 .77 
APL Corp. -.96 2.71 -.27 .28 + .15 .31 
Duplex Products + .40 .36 + .60 1.13 + .70 2.66 
Pantasote Inc. + .04 .00 + .22 .14 + ol2 .08 
Helene Curtis + .10 .02 + .36 .27 -.11 .05 
Ashland Oil -.23 .42 + .10 .10 + .04 .03 
Armstrong Rubber -.08 .02 + .47 .86 + .17 .24 
Cellucraft -.76 .51 + .49 .26 + .24 .15 
Robintech + .70 .62 + .21 .07 + .35 .38 
Hoffman Inds. + .52 .61 + .91 2.45 + .82 4.18* 
National Can + .22 .24 + .40 1.24 + .32 1.52 
Brooks and 
Perkins + .44 .44 + .35 .35 + .19 .22 
Republic + .33 .16 +1.20 2.69 + .68 2.30 
Ester!ine + .63 1.63 + .97 5.54* + .70 8.08* 
Scott & Fetzer -.46 1.40 -.28 .67 -.15 .32 
Goul d -.50 1.67 -.38 1.17 -.27 1.19 
Moog + .59 1.08 +1.22 6.62* +1.00 9.65* 
Analog Devices + .23 .13 + .46 .67 + .35 .75 
International 
Rectifier + .11 .02 + .32 .25 + .20 .20 
Arrow Automotive +1.20 1.75 +1.48 3.72 +1.05 3.44 
Intermark -.73 .89 -.75 1.15 -.30 .33 
Whitaker Cable -.38 .51 + .39 .58 + .09 .06 
Mattel + .76 .60 + .82 .69 + .25 .16 
Banner Inds. + .60 .52 +1.46 3.90 + .89 3.09 
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Table 34 (Continued) 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 
Spector + .49 .41 + .40 .31 + .44 .80 
Action Inds. -.75 .72 -.19 .06 + .07 .02 
Sterling 
Electronics -.64 .41 -.53 .35 -.45 .54 
SMD Inds. + .87 1.56 +1.89 9.73* +1.27 8.54* 
Gray Drug -.31 .30 + .07 .02 + .07 .04 
Payless Drug 
Stores -.30 .41 + .02 .00 -.10 .14 
Jewel cor -.17 .04 + .04 .00 -.28 .32 
Suburban 
Propane -.45 .75 -.35 .60 -.23 .49 
Bolt, Beranek 
& Newman + .15 .04 + .73 1.26 + .26 .33 
Cenco + .24 .06 + .65 .57 + .50 .67 
Huntingdon 
Health -.21 .09 + .03 .00 + .26 .38 
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Table 35 
Chow Test Statistics and Beta Changes -- 
SFAS 13 Non-Capitalizing Firms - Period 3 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 
Consolidated 
Foods -.65 3.65 -.72 6.25* -.52 5.41* 
Rath Packing + .72 .96 +1.05 2.43 + .61 1.69 
Staley Mfg. + .26 .25 + .20 .19 + .11 .11 
West Point 
Pepperel -.36 .91 -.23 .44 -.11 .16 
Billy The Kid -.23 .05 -.09 .01 -.43 .46 
Damon Creations 1.36 4.40* -.40 .40 -.44 1.03 
Manhattan Inds. -1.00 2.97 -.48 .80 -.23 .40 
Noel Inds. -.65 .64 + .03 .00 -.16 .09. 
Phillis Van 
Heusen -.88 1.85 .00 .00 + .06 .02 
Piedmont Inds. + .04 .00 +1.03 1.23 + .71 1.21 
Puritan Fashions -.02 .00 +1.30 2.42 + .74 1.89 
Golden West Homes -1.34 2.67 -.40 .25 -.62 1.35 
APL Corp. -.98 2.58 -.28 .26 -.18 .24 
Duplex Products .40 .32 + .61 1.09 + .72 2.70 
Pantasote Inc. -.12 .03 + .04 .00 -.03 .00 
Helene Curtis + .17 .04 + .37 .27 -.11 .05 
Ashland Oil -.15 .17 + .12 .15 + .04 .03 
Armstrong Rubber -.22 .15 + .37 .50 + .10 .09 
Cellucraft -.81 .56 + .38 .17 + .13 .04 
Robintech -1.24 2.03 -.04 .00 + .12 .06 
Hoffman Inds. + .52 .61 + .91 2.45 + .82 4.15* 
Natioinal Can + .35 .32 + .42 1.41 + .32 1.55 
Brooks and 
Perkins + .48 .49 + .36 .34 + .20 .24 
Republic -.30 .13 +1.23 2.72 + .76 2.69 
Ester!ine + .75 2.21 + .99 5.73* + .73 8.66* 
Scott & Fetzer + .36 .76 -.26 .52 -.14 .26 
Gould -.67 2.74 -.52 2.10 -.35 1.88 
Moog + .55 .88 +1.17 5.71* + .98 8.73* 
Analog Devices + .37 .31 + .55 .93 + .48 1.32 
International 
Rectifier + .37 .25 + .51 .62 + .33 .59 
Arrow Automotive + .99 1.12 +1.37 3.07 +1.01 2.94 
Intermark -.60 .56 -.68 .92 -.23 .18 
Whitaker Cable -.24 .19 -.39 .88 + .18 .29 
Mattel + .76 .60 + .82 .69 + .25 .16 





Company Change Statistic 
Spector + .65 .67 
Action Inds. -.87 .96 
Sterling 
Electronics -.54 .27 
SMD Inds. +1.09 2.31 
Gray Drug -.24 .18 
Payless Drug 
Stores -.31 .42 
Jewel cor -.20 .05 
Suburban Propane -.29 .29 
Bolt, Beranek 
& Newman + .26 .12 
Cenco + .24 .06 
Huntingdon 
Health -.11 .03 
(Continued) 
VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Change Statistic Change Statistic 
+ .50 .47 + .52 1.06 
-.27 .11 -.01 .00 
-.51 .31 -.45 .49 
+2.06 11.46* +1.45 11.09* 
+ .11 .05 + .10 .07 
-.03 .00 -.14 .24 
-.00 .00 -.28 .32 
-.24 .25 -.16 .20 
+ .73 1.57 + .39 .68 
+ .65 .57 + .50 .67 
+ .06 .01 + .30 .48 
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Table 36 
Chow Test Statistics and Beta Changes -- 
SFAS 13 Capital 
SP INDEX 
Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic 
Quaker Oats -.72 4.54* 
Valmac Inds. -.31 .21 
American Maize 
Products -.38 .53 
Riegel Textile + .05 .02 
Jonathan Logan -034 .15 
Superior Surgical 
Mfg. -.12 .03 
Salant Corp. -1.01 2.86 
Decorator Inds. -.39 .51 
House of Ronnie -.01 .00 
Movie Star Inc. -.32 .48 
Palm Beach Inc. -1.16 3.64 
Kit Mfg. + .20 .04 
Dennison Mfg. + .11 .23 
Ennis Business 
Forms -.09 .04 
Reichold Chemical + .39 .66 
Faberge Inc. + .44 .72 
Cities Service 
Co. + .18 .26 
Mohawk Rubber + .03 .01 
Monogram Inds. + .32 .30 
Voplex Corp. -.45 .64 
Allegheny Ludlum -.01 .00 
Van Dorn Co. -.32 .51 
Nucor Corp. + .71 2.23 
Philips Inds. + .40 .30 
Acme Cleveland + .25 .40 
National Mine 
Service + .22 .12 
UV Inds. -.07 .02 
Barnes 
Engineering + .35 .19 
Veeco Instruments + .36 .24 
Electro Audio 
Dynamics + .12 .04 
Howell Inds. + .22 .38 
Federal-Mogul + .83 .86 
zing Firms - Period 1 
VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Change Statistic Change Statistic 
-.15 .18 -.16 .40 
-.53 .80 + .06 .02 
-.44 .97 -.10 .09 
+ .44 2.00 + .29 2.10 
+ .07 .01 + .00 .00 
+ .25 .15 + .07 .03 
-.24 .16 -.38 1.03 
-.39 .58 -.16 .21 
+ .20 -.18 -.29 1.12 
-.09 .04 + .03 .01 
-.26 .24 + .04 .01 
+ .04 .03 + .17 .22 
+ .15 .18 + .00 .00 
+ .40 .99 + .32 1.39 
+ .34 .71 + .17 .33 
+ .59 1.63 + .41 1.67 
-.12 .15 + .00 .00 
+ .26 .52 + .15 .45 
+ .28 .28 -.05 .03 
+ .01 .00 -.04 .01 
+ .27 .54 + .21 .75 
-.30 .53 -.14 .28 
+ .69 2.71 + .21 .63 
+ .96 2.32 + .49 1.50 
+ .51 1.98 + .27 1.32 
+ .21 .15 + .13 .11 
-.23 .27 -.12 .13 
+1.37 3.62 + .97 4.60* 
+ .73 1.26 + .85 4.26* 
+ .67 1.50 + .46 1.79 
+ .49 2.35 + .19 .80 
+1.34 2.77 + .64 1.26 
162 
Table 36 (Continued) 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 
Kysor Industrial + .25 .17 + .74 2.04 + .21 .39 
Medalist Inds. + .17 .10 + .42 .84 + .14 .25 
Golden Cycle 
Corp. -.63 .36 -1.05 1.25 -.41 .33 
Telecom Corp. -.04 .01 + .24 .21 + .31 .78 
Clark 
Consolidated -.43 .28 -1.13 2.58 -.43 .73 
Arrow Electronics + .05 .01 + .12 .04 + .53 1.96 
Universal Leaf 
Tobacco -.33 .83 -.02 .01 + .07 .08 
Cunningham Drugs -.33 .52 -.21 .28 -.33 1.58 
Revco Drug Stores -.36 .56 -.16 .12 -.09 .06 
Medo Jewelry 
Corp. -1.57 2.82 -.152 3.20 -.92 2.36 
DWG Corp. -.72 .96 -.57 .76 -.19 .22 
Chilton Corp. -.20 .08 + .21 .11 -.22 .33 
Beverly Enter¬ 
prises + .71 .77 + .78 1.23 + .42 .86 













House of Ronnie 
Movie Star Inc. 




























Chow Test Statistics and Beta Changes — 
SFAS 13 Capitalizing Firms - Period 2 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 
-.53 1.93 -.02 .01 + .06 .04 
-.44 .36 -.47 .59 + .00 .00 
+ .20 .14 + .14 .09 + .22 .39 
-.57 2.36 -.10 .08 -.14 .36 
+ .24 o06 + .79 .78 + .29 .23 
-.54 .53 -.04 .00 -.15 .10 
-1.07 2.88 -.16 .04 -.29 .50 
-.81 2.12 -.68 1.65 -.62 3.09 
-.12 .05 + .23 .23 -.24 .67 
-.60 1.46 -.42 .84 -.24 .67 
-1.21 3.61 -.15 .07 + .23 .32 
-.81 .63 -.70 .61 -.59 .94 
-.43 1.18 -.15 .14 -.24 .86 
-.16 .11 + .26 .38 + .23 .60 
' + .12 .06 + .23 .30 + .02 .01 
+ .41 .60 + .50 1.12 + .39 1.42 
+ .27 .57 -.08 .06 + .02 .01 
+ .13 .07 + .48 1.23 + .24 .79 
+ .33 .29 + .57 1.04 + .10 .08 
-.64 1.13 -.21 .16 -.11 .10 
-.24 .30 + .26 + .46 + .12 .20 
-.41 .74 -.06 .02 -.10 .11 
+ .02 .00 -.06 .02 -.32 1.21 
-.44 .33 + .43 .44 + .15 .13 
+ .26 .38 + .47 1.46 + .33 1.66 
+ .23 .12 + .28 .22 + .20 .24 
-.26 .25 -.31 .46 -.25 .60 
+ .04 .00 +1.22 2.53 + .81 2.67 
-.26 .13 + .28 .18 + .30 .50 
+ .22 .12 + .90 2.66 + .57 2.75 
-.10 .07 + .26 .66 + .03 .02 
-.22 .06 + .24 .08 -.08 .02 
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Table 37 (Continued) 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 
Kysor Industrial -.46 .52 + .06 .01 -.23 .41 
Medalist Inds. -.03 .00 + .30 .42 + .10 .12 
Golden Cycle 
Corp. -.56 .25 -1.24 1.55 -.58 .60 
Telecom Corp. + .17 .07 + .55 .88 + .25 .43 
Clark 
Consolidated -.14 .03 -.40 .28 -.18 .11 
Arrow Electronics -.40 .35 -.11 .04 + .22 .35 
Universal Leaf 
Tobacco -.41 1.14 -.05 .02 + .10 .18 
Cunningham Drugs -.13 .07 + .03 .01 -.10 .11 
Revco Drug Stores -.42 .69 -.31 .44 + .00 .00 
Medco Jewelry 
Corp. -1.99 4.14* -1.53 3.03 -1.25 4.03* 
DWG Corp. 1.13 2.12 -.53 .61 -.42 .87 
Chilton Corp. -.51 .44 -.14 .04 -.56 1.54 
Beverly Enter¬ 
prises +1.17 2.08 +1.59 5.13* + .97 4.43* 
Humana Inc. = .43 .40 + .90 2.51 + .67 2.66 
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Table 38 
Chow Test Statistics and Beta Changes -- 












House of Ronnie 
Movie Star Inc. 
































+ .12 .05 
-.54 2.04 











+ .38 .45 
+ .32 .70 
+ .08 .00 




+ .11 .05 
-.60 .57 
+ .51 1.62 
+ .07 .01 
+ .02 .00 
-.16 .03 
-.61 .67 



















+ .36 .60 
+ .11 .07 
+ .44 .80 
-.07 .04 
+ .40 .86 
+ .68 1.42 
-.12 .05 
+ .27 .49 
-.09 .03 
-.04 .01 
+ .32 .23 
+ .57 2.32 




+ .84 2.10 
+ .18 .24 




+ .08 .06 
-.02 .00 
+ .04 .02 
-.11 .23 






+ .25 .35 
-.86 2.04 
-.25 .97 
+ .29 .88 
-.06 .04 
+ .35 1.11 
+ .04 .02 
+ .20 .53 
+ .25 .39 
-.03 .00 
+ .14 .27 
-.11 .15 
+ .32 1.12 
+ .08 .04 
+ .43 3.39 
+ .07 .03 
-.10 .11 
+ .70 1.94 
+ .05 .01 































+ .48 .49 
+ .00 .00 
-.36 .25 
-.27 .59 












+ .18 .11 
+ .18 .15 
-1.02 1.04 
+ .70 1.29 
-.38 .25 
-..07 .02 
+ .01 .00 











+ .01 .00 
-.45 .34 
+ .39 .92 
-.15 .08 
+ .25 .38 






+ .85 3.25 
+ .76 3.54 
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Table 39 
Chow Test Statistics and Beta Changes-- 
SFAS 13 Supplemental Firms - Period 1 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 




Multifoods -.25 .62 -.01 .00 -.14 .43 
Bartons Candy -.37 .29 + .04 .00 -.04 .01 
Heublein -.93 4.44* -.81 4.61* -.68 5.64* 
CHB Foods +1.41 3.78 +1.46 4.91* +1.13 5.61* 
Atlantic 
Richfield -.10 .09 -.10 .22 + .04 .04 
Stride Rite + .04 .01 + .19 .28 + .09 .15 
Huck Mfg. + .44 .52 + .41 .62 + .29 .55 
Craig Corp. -.87 1.65 -.35 .32 -.44 1.25 
Macrodyne + .60 .32 +1.28 1.93 + .79 1.56 
Conroy -.77 1.19 -.50 .60 -.31 .55 
Delta Airlines -.47 1.47 -.31 .96 -.10 .18 
Scot Lad Foods -.53 1.12 -.27 .41 -.27 1.01 
A1exanders -1.52 5.44* -.93 2.47 -.80 4.62* 
Allied Stores -.69 4.12* -.36 1.31 -.44 4.67* 
Ames Dept. Stores + .16 .08 + .21 .48 + .12 .14 
Associated Dry 
Goods -.64 2.58 -.23 .42 -.28 1.19 
Carter Hawley, 
Hale -1.36 6.81* -.45 .72 -.71 4.38* 
Crowley Milner -.10 .06 + .15 .16 -.16 .37 
Dayton Hudson + .13 .08 + .17 .18 -.10 .15 
Dillard -.53 2.03 -.53 2.31 -.35 2.21 
Federated Dept. 
Stores -.63 3.86 -.66 5.18* -.59 9.00* 
Jamesway Corp. + .59 .72 +1.52 5.43* + .82 3.64 
Marshall Field + .00 .00 + .16 .12 + .05 .03 
Mercantile Stores -1.17 6.56* -.60 1.75 -.74 5.57* 
Outlet Co. -.24 .33 + .06 .02 + .03 .01 
Sears Roebuck + .42 2.43 + .02 .00 -.10 .38 
Vornado -.44 .26 + .26 .11 + .25 .27 
Wieboldt Stores -.37 .34 -.01 .00 + .08 .04 
Zayre Corp. -.46 .44 -.01 .00 -.20 .27 
Caldor's Inc. -.38 .60 + .07 .02 -.16 .24 
King's Dept. 
Stores -.38 .65 -.40 .83 -.30 1.04 
Rapid American -.79 1.34 -.57 .90 -o29 .51 
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Table 39 (Continued) 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 
Walmart Stores -.84 1.63 -.26 .19 -.81 4.17* 
A1bertsons -.12 .13 + .06 .03 + .14 .36 
A1terman -.95 3.24 -.60 1.63 -.43 1.57 
Circle K -.36 .33 -.23 .19 -.04 .01 
Dillon Cos. -.61 3.53 -.38 1.61 -.35 3.01 
Fairmont Foods + .37 .62 + .18 .16 + .11 .12 
Great A&P + .74 1.93 + .97 4.42* + .51 2.54 
Laneco -.60 .72 -.39 .36 -.31 .49 
Lucky Stores 
Niagra Frontier 
-.78 4.71* -.59 3.27 -.60 9.96* 
Systems -.02 .00 -.41 .87 -.28 .79 
Penn Traffic + .77 4.35* + .79 5.52* + .53 4.82* 
Petrolane -.54 1.61 -.16 .17 -.28 1.19 
Ruddick -.32 .43 -.19 .21 -.28 1.01 
Safeway Stores 
Supermarkets 
-.29 1.04 -.46 3.63 -.29 2.70 
General -.48 .85 -.10 .04 -.40 1.50 
Thriftimart -.55 1.31 -.52 1.68 -.25 .81 
Winn-Dixie Stores -.76 4.38* -.35 1.06 -.30 1.54 
Bel scot Retailers -1.47 3.41 -.36 .23 -.60 1.43 
Masters -1.63 4.32* -1.08 2.22 -1.37 8.92* 
Lane Bryant + .28 .28 + .88 3.40 + .71 4.58* 
Levitz Furniture -.39 .24 + .24 .11 -.50 1.31 
RB Inds. 
Carrols 
-.30 .12 + .87 1.26 + .34 .42 
Development 
Churchs Fried 
+ .45 .29 + .83 1.34 + .61 1.46 
Chicken 
Collins Foods 
-.29 .20 -.21 .13 -.26 .39 
International -.15 .05 + .68 1.33 + .36 .99 
Denny's -1.18 4.86* -1.02 5.40* -.68 4.13 
Marriott Corp. + .11 .04 + .34 .50 + .18 .24 
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Table 40 
Chow Test Statistics and Beta Changes-- 
















Scot Lad Foods 
A1exanders 
Allied Stores 

























+ .77 1.01 
+ .26 .65 
-.50 1.54 
+ .58 .84 
-.96 1.53 



























+ .77 1.28 
+ .19 .46 
-.41 1.29 
+ .73 1.58 
-.29 .18 

















+ .58 .56 
-.53 .81 
+ .22 .10 










+ .67 1.71 
+ .31 1.89 
-.22 .74 
+ .11 .94 
-.05 1.32 
+ .60 .74 
+ .48 1.59 















+ .48 .95 
-.24 .36 
-.05 .01 
+ .01 .00 
-.33 .49 
-.29 .44 
Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Change Statistic Change Statistic 
-.18 .40 -.19 .58 
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Table 40 (Continued) 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 
Walmart Stores -.55 .65 + .07 .01 -.48 1.29 
A1bertsons + .36 .97 + .51 2.39 + .46 3.35 
A1terman -.21 .15 -.03 .00 + .14 .16 
Circle K -.36 .32 -.27 .25 -.05 .02 
Dillon Cos. -.65 3.42 -.31 .82 -.34 2.20 
Fairmont Foods + .50 .98 + .24 .28 + .22 .41 
Great A&P +1.04 3.15 +1.42 8.08* + .86 5.97* 
Laneco -.17 .05 + .31 .20 + .04 .01 
Lucky Stores 
Niagra Frontier 
-.21 .29 + .01 .00 -.12 .29 
Systems + .14 .07 -.28 .35 -.27 .67 
Penn Traffic + .49 1.60 + .60 2.80 + .33 1.57 
Petrolane -.44 .93 -.09 .05 -.20 .47 
Ruddick -.38 .51 -.25 .25 -.38 1.23 
Safeway Stores 
Supermarkets 
+ .09 .09 + .06 .05 -.04 .03 
General -.17 .10 + .20 .13 -.14 .14 
Thriftimart -.46 .92 -.34 .68 -.03 .01 
Winn-Dixie Stores -.94 8.10* -.54 2.98 -.40 3.37 
Bel scot Retailers -1.10 2.04 -.08 .01 -.38 .63 
Masters -1.04 1.86 -.59 .70 -.96 4.66* 
Lane Bryant 
Levitz 
+ .07 .06 + .65 2.22 + .41 1.82 
Furniture + .01 .00 + .61 .84 -.19 .21 
RB Inds. 
Carrols 
+ .99 1.42 +1.85 6.84* +1.19 6.13* 
Development 
Churchs Fried 
+ .80 1.23 + .90 3.01 + .87 3.94 
Chicken 
Collins Food 




 • -.04 .06 
International -.20 .10 + .45 .70 + .36 .57 
Denny:1 s -1.12 4.58* -1.13 6.99* -.79 6.36* 
Marriott;Corp. + .00 .00 + .03 .01 -.02 .00 
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Table 41 
Chow Test Statistics and Beta Changes — 
SFAS 13 Supplemental Firms - Period 3 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EWJNDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 






 • -.11 .30 
International 
Multi foods -.56 2.53 -.18 .30 .29 1.86 
Bartons Candy -.77 1.01 -.72 1.13 -.62 1.82 
Heublein -.86 3.33 -.71 3.16 -.72 5.54* 
CHB Foods + .73 .84 + .77 1.15 + .69 1.70 
Atlantic 
Richfield + .29 .72 + .13 .70 + .35 2.24 
Stride Rite -.47 1.29 -.40 1.12 -.20 .58 
Huck Mfg. + .71 1.22 + .77 1.71 + .44 1.13 
Craig Corp. -1.07 1.77 + .35 .26 -.59 1.51 
Macrodyne + .44 .15 + .97 .97 + .79 1.27 
Conroy -1.06 1.43 -.89 1.24 -.68 1.61 
Delta Airlines -.27 .41 -.06 .03 + .04 .03 
Scot Lad Foods -.44 .68 -.12 .07 -.06 .04 
Alexanders -1.16 2.66 -.59 .85 -.60 2.05 
Allied Stores -.49 1.90 -.01 .00 -.21 .82 
Ames Dept. Stores + .02 .00 + .05 .01 + .00 .00 
Associated Dry 





.05 -.19 .39 
Carter Hawley, 
Hal e -.87 2.39 + .17 .09 -.20 .31 
Crowley Milner -.23 .27 -.10 .06 -.39 1.84 
Dayton Hudson -.31 .35 -.24 .30 -.39 1.60 
Dillard -.51 1.54 -.43 1.27 -.34 1.64 
Federated Dept. 
Stores -.40 1.31 -.35 1.26 -.39 2.89 
Jamesway Corp. + .43 .29 +1.24 2.86 + .70 2.02 
Marshall Field + .31 .32 + .47 .96 + .32 .75 
Mercantile Stores -.98 3.98* -.64 1.78 -.54 4.15* 
Outlet Co. -.46 1.00 -.15 .13 -.08 .10 
Sears Roebuck -.37 1.55 + .05 .04 -.05 .07 
Vornado -.17 .04 + .71 .80 + .60 1.39 
Wieboldt Stores -1.06 2.49 -.60 .98 -.25 .37 
Zayre Corp. -.30 .16 + .28 .116 -.02 .00 
Caldor's Inc. + .12 .06 + .49 1.04 + .16 .22 
King's Dept. 
Stores -.46 .75 -.30 .41 -.26 .41 
Rapid American -.95 1.87 -.48 .59 -.29 .47 
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Table 41 (Continued) 
SP INDEX VW INDEX EW INDEX 
Beta Chow Beta Chow Beta Chow 
Company Change Statistic Change Statistic Change Statistic 
Walmart Stores - .48 .47 + .12 .04 -.43 1.04 
A1bertsons +.35 .90 +.46 1.90 + .42 2.69 
ATterman -.22 .16 .11 .05 + .08 .05 
Circle K -.42 .38 -.33 .34 -.12 .08 
Dillon Cos. -.67 3.28 -.31 .77 -.33 1.90 
Fairmont Foods + .43 .70 + .14 .09 + .11 .11 
Great A&P +1.10 3.49 +1.47 8.39* + .88 5.91* 
Laneco + .11 .02 + .47 .42 + .12 .06 
Lucky Stores 
Niagra Frontier 
-.10 .06 + .05 .03 -.10 .19 
Systems + .25 .22 -.22 .21 -.27 .57 
Penn Traffic + .47 1.34 + .57 2.37 + .31 1.36 
Petrolane -.40 .75 -.08 .03 -.20 .48 
Ruddick -.34 .35 -.24 .24 -.38 1.17 
Safeway Stores 
Supermarkets 
+ .07 .05 + .02 .01 -.08 .15 
General -.16 .07 + .21 .13 -.13 .13 
Thriftimart -.39 .60 -.29 .49 + .01 .00 
Winn-Dixie Stores -.75 4.22* -.35 1.08 -.33 1.79 
Bel scot Retailers -1.58 4.62* -.51 .49 -.67 1.87 
Masters -1.75 4.95* -1.27 3.02 -1.53 11.24* 
LaneBryant 
Levitz 
+ .53 .93 +1.06 4.93* + .86 6.70* 
Furniture -.31 .16 + .27 .13 -.53 1.46 
RB Inds. 
Carrols 
-.37 .16 + .81 1.06 + .23 .20 
Development 
Churchs Fried 







.09 -.14 .06 -.20 .23 
International + .35 .25 + .28 3.12 + .64 3.20 
Denny's -1.23 4.94* -1.07 5.47* 0.72 4.33* 
Marriott Corp. + .07 .02 + .32 .40 + .19 .26 
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Summary of Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test 
for Residuals Estimated with Dimson Betas 
ASR 147 
Wilcoxon T Statistics (Significance Level) 
SP 
40 day 20 day 
vw 
40 day 20 day 
EW 
40 day 20 day 
pre & post pre & post pre & post 
Critical Event post only post only post only 
Proposal Announce¬ 
ment (June 6, 
1973) 420(.45) 115(.35) 423(.43) 115(.35) 417(.46) 116(.34) 
Proposal Adopted 
(October 5, 
1973) 394(.59) 102(.55) 397(.57) 102(.55) 405(.53) 102(.55) 
SFAS 13 
First Exposure Draft 
(August 26, 
1975) 486(.19) 127{.21) 488(.15) 129(.19) 500(.11) 130(.18) 
Second Exposure Draft 
(July 22, 
1976) 437(.36) 103(.53) 438(.35) 103(.53) 450(.30) 107(.47) 
SFAS 13 Announcement 
(November 30, 
1976) 315(.90) 73(.88) 298(.90) 73(.88) 326(.87) 75(.87) 
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